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I. INTRODUCTION
It’s 4:00 p.m. on a Tuesday.  As the clock continues to tick, a young 
woman frantically types, eager to finish a report that needs to be on her
boss’s desk by the end of the day.  A single mother of two, she rushes out of
the office to pick up her children from school and heads home to start 
preparing dinner.  Right when she sets her keys down, she remembers what 
day it is.  It’s not just any Tuesdayit is Election Day.  After four years
with a president that does not represent her, she is ready for change.
Increased funding for education, criminal justice reform, and a clean energy 
initiative are all on her state’s ballot this year, and all affect her and her 
children’s lives.
She knows the power of her vote, yet she is painfully aware of her current
limitations.  I cannot leave work early, and there is no way I can make it
to the polls before my kids get out of school.  Next election, she thinks.  I’ll 
vote next election. This is an all-too-common experience for millions of
Americans.1 It is easy to believe that the political landscape of this nation
would change if this busy single mother, and millions of other Americans,
had the option to vote by using an app on a smartphone or by logging on to a 
home computer.  Blockchain technology is ready to provide this nation with
secure, accessible, and inclusive elections. 
Put simply, blockchain is a list of transactions involving value.2  Each
“block” is a transaction that forms a link that, once verified, joins other 
1. Campbell Robertson, Millions on Election Day Make a Different Decision: Not 
Voting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/voter-
turnout.html.  In the 2016 presidential election, ninety-two million eligible voters did not
cast a ballot. See Michael P. McDonald, 2016 General Election Turnout Rates, UNITED
STATES ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://www.electproject.org/2016g (last visited Feb. 5, 2018)
(listing statistics from each state’s official Secretary of State website).
2. See How Does Bitcoin Work?, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works [https://
perma.cc/HTL5-3TTD] (defining blockchain as a “shared public ledger” of confirmed
transactions).  Because this is a somewhat abstract concept, an analogy may help to clarify 
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links to create a linear “chain” of that transaction’s history.3  Because each
link is built on the last, any attempt to tamper with individual transactions 
breaks a link in the chain, invalidating the blockchain.4 
As a result, blockchain technology provides a cryptographically secure 
and transparent method for transferring “digital assets.”5  Although blockchain 
technology is most commonly recognized as the technology that underpins
virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, it may also hold the key to facilitating 
secure online elections in America.
To preface the need for blockchain voting, Part II addresses the current 
problems with voting in the United States.  Part III provides an elementary
explanation of blockchain.  Parts IV and V outline current election laws and 
explain how implementing blockchain voting would very likely comply with 
these laws. Transitioning to a new voting system, however, does not come
without challenges.  Thus, the remainder of Part V outlines valid concerns
with and counterarguments against blockchain voting.  Part VI advocates
for congressional action, tracing the failed regulation of Bitcoin back to the
lack of uniform guidance. 
The time is ripe for modernization, yet current proposals for online voting
lack the sophistication necessary to implement a secure and trusted system.
Thus, Part VII of this Comment proposes that Congress pass a bill authorizing
blockchain’s structure.  Think about blockchain as a book.  A book is a collection of ideas, 
characters, and themes that make up a story. Authors change the direction of that story by
selecting different words and developing different characters. The result is a unique “chain” of
events that creates the story. Now envision each “block” as a page in the book.  If one page is
missing or inaccurate, the rest of the story cannot be developed.  It breaks the narrative 
and makes it impossible to build upon the previous storyline.  This is essentially the idea 
behind blockchain, but instead of one author, there are many different parties verifying that the
transactions that go into the chain, or the information written on each page, is correct.
3. Although comparing blockchain to a physical chain may help conceptualize it, 
this drastically oversimplifies the technology. For a more technical discussion of how 
blockchain works, see Steven Norton, CIO Explainer: What Is Blockchain?, WALL ST. J.:
CIO J. (Feb. 2, 2016, 12:49 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/02/02/cio-explainer­
what-is-blockchain; see also Dave Hudson, Blockchain, What Art Thou? Defining an
Industry Buzzword, COINDESK (Jan. 16, 2016, 4:40 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/
blockchain-what-art-thou-buzzword [https://perma.cc/AR3K-FY2H].
4. See Hudson, supra note 3 (describing the process of cryptographic hashing as 
it relates to ensuring the secure construction of a chain).
5. “Digital assets” can include anything from digital currency, share and financial 
securities, smart property, digital subscriptions, event tickets, crowdfunding, etc.  For a more
detailed description, see generally BITFURY GRP., DIGITAL ASSETS ON PUBLIC BLOCKCHAINS
(Mar. 15, 2016), http://bitfury.com/content/5-white-papers-research/bitfury-digital_assets_on_ 
public_blockchains-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH8U-3BE8]. 
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The right of all eligible citizens to vote is a constitutionally protected
right.6 It is a defining feature of our representative government and
fundamental to the advancement of our democratic society.7  However, 
there are three main threats to our existing voting system today that, if left
unchecked, could compromise the representative nature of our democracy: (1)
economic barriers to voting in person; (2) confusion surrounding mail-in
ballots; and (3) insecure methods for counting ballots.  These barriers, not 
surprisingly, have resulted in lower participation.8  In 2014, just 36.3% of 
eligible voters participated in the midterm general election the worst
turnout in 72 years.9  In 2016, 28.5% of eligible voters participated in
the Republican and Democratic presidential primaries, despite the
excitement surrounding anti-establishment candidates like Donald Trump and
Bernie Sanders.10 Of those voters, about half voted for Hillary Clinton or
6. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626–27 (1969) (holding that a 
state law limiting the right to vote in school district elections must further a compelling
state interest and be narrowly tailored in order to be valid, thereby elevating the right to 
vote to the strict scrutiny requirements applicable to other fundamental rights); Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (“Undeniably the Constitution of the United States 
protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections.”).
7. Reynolds, 337 U.S. at 555 (“The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s
choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at 
the heart of representative government.”).
8.  Scott Clement, Why Don’t Americans Vote? We’re “Too Busy.”, WASH. POST: FIX
(July 17, 2015) (citing THOM FILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO VOTES? CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE: 1978–2014 (July 2015), https://www.census. 
gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p20-577.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4P6S-2DZ9]), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/ 07/17/why-dont­
americans-vote-were-too-busy [https://perma.cc/P9MW-RC4M] (noting that a general lack 
of interest is at the top of the list of reasons why people did not vote in 2014). 
9. The Editorial Board, The Worst Voter Turnout in 72 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/opinion/the-worst-voter-turnout-in-72-years.html.
 10. Drew DeSilver, Turnout Was High in the 2016 Primary Season, but Just Short 
of 2008 Record, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (June 10, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/ 
fact-tank/2016/06/10/turnout-was-high-in-the-2016-primary-season-but-just-short-of-2008­
record [https://perma.cc/ANA4-L2CE].  Despite a “heated battle” between Hillary Clinton 
and Bernie Sanders, Democratic voter turnout was still far below the 2008 record of
19.5%. Id.  What is more troubling, however, is the fact that even if turnout had reached 
numbers close to the 2008 record, just one in five eligible voters would have participated in
nominating our future leaders. See Dan Roberts, Crashing the Parties: Sanders and Trump
Victories Vindicate the ‘Outsiders,’ GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2016, 8:09 AM), https://www. 
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Donald Trump.11  That means that 14% of eligible voting adults, or just 9%
of the whole nation, picked the two viable presidential nominees of the 2016 
election.12 
The fate of our elections has been placed in the hands of primary
voters, a very small and highly partisan group of dedicated voters.13  To
win, candidates need only appeal to this small and ideologically driven 
segment of the electorate, ignoring the needs of the majority of Americans
they are elected to represent.14  As a result, most 2016 general election 
voters were presented with two candidates they did not support.15  Forced to 
vote for the lesser of two evils or risk wasting a vote on a third-party 
candidate, 42% opted out of participating altogether.16 The 2016 election was
theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/10/donald-trump-bernie-sanders-new-hampshire­
primary-anti-establishment-outsider-campaigns [https://perma.cc/2MET-HE2J].
11.  Alicia Parlapiano & Adam Pearce, Only 9% of America Chose Trump and Clinton 
as the Nominees, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/ 
08/01/us/elections/nine-percent-of-america-selected-trump-and-clinton.html. 
12. Id.
 13. See  PEW RESEARCH CTR., PARTISANSHIP AND POLITICAL ANIMOSITY IN 2016
(June 2016), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2016/06/06-22-16­
Partisanship-and-animosity-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/83X5-SYUC] (finding a strong 
link between political participation and partisan antipathy).  “Today, 55% of Democrats 
and 58% of Republicans view the other party in deeply negative terms,” marking the first 
time in twenty years of Pew Research Center Surveys where the majority of partisans “not 
only have an unfavorable view of the other party, but a very unfavorable one.” Id. at 9. 
Pew notes that these voters tend to participate at higher rates, citing that “partisans who 
are highly engaged in politics—those who nearly always vote and have either donated 
money to or volunteered for a campaign in the past year—feel more coldly toward 
members of the other party . . . .” Id. at 14. For example, “individuals with no negative 
partisan stereotypes were less likely to participate in politics. Conversely, those who
associate three or more negative traits with people in the opposing party . . . participate in
politics at the highest rates.” Id. at 34.  This is expounded by columnist Ezra Klein, who
states, “American politics is increasingly driven by a small group of highly ideological, 
highly partisan, highly politically engaged people.”  Ezra Klein, The Single Most Important
Fact About American Politics, VOX (Apr. 28, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.vox.com/ 
2014/6/13/5803768/pew-most-important-fact-american-politics [https://perma.cc/Q3V3­
TT4J]. 
14. See Shawn M. Griffiths, When Only Partisan Voters Vote, Only Partisan Candidates
Are Elected, IVN (June 16, 2014), http://ivn.us/2014/06/16/partisan-voters-vote-partisan­
candidates-elected [https://perma.cc/48PV-6HT4].
15. See Eliza Collins, Poll: Clinton, Trump Most Unfavorable Candidates Ever, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 31, 2016, 9:47 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/ 
onpolitics/2016/08/31/poll-clinton-trump-most-unfavorable-candidates-ever/89644296 
[https://perma.cc/4QY6-ZYHE].
16. Michael D. Regan, What Does Voter Turnout Tell Us About the 2016 Election?, 
PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 20, 2016, 3:03 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/voter­
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not decided by an enthusiastic nation yearning for change—it was decided
by those who chose not to vote.17 It is precisely this phenomenon that makes
reform so necessary.
A. Our Flawed System: What’s Wrong with Voting in America
1. The Rising Cost of Voting in Person 
For many Americans, the cost and inconvenience of turning out to the 
polls are simply not worth the benefit of voting.  To cast a ballot in person, a
voter must first find and travel to the voter’s polling station.  This is not
an easy task for all Americans.18 
Of further inconvenience, general elections are uniformly held on 
Tuesdays.19  Although instituting elections on a weekday may have fit the
needs of our formerly agrarian society, holding elections on a weekday
discourages otherwise eligible voters from participating.20  As a result, 
turnout-2016-elections [https://perma.cc/MHQ6-YR5C] (citing to low turnout in key swing
states like Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Michigan as a factor in deciding the election).
17. Omri Ben-Shahar, The Non-Voters Who Decided the Election: Trump Won Because 
of Lower Democratic Turnout, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2016, 4:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
omribenshahar/2016/11/17/the-non-voters-who-decided-the-election-trump-won-because-of­
lower-democratic-turnout [https://perma.cc/J8L5-9GAS].
18. In the 2016 general election, 3.3 million registered voters cited “inconvenient
polling places” as a reason why they did not vote. This number was calculated by multiplying 
the total number of reported registered voters in November 2016 by the percentage of
registered voters who cited to “inconvenient polling place” as a reason for not voting. See
Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2016: Table 1, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(May 2017), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/
p20-580.html [https://perma.cc/M2QQ-AHHX] [hereinafter Table 1, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU]
(follow “Table 1” hyperlink for excel sheet); Voting and Registration in the Election of 
November 2016: Table 10, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 2017), https://www.census.gov/
data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-580.html [https://perma.cc/M2QQ-
AHHX] [hereinafter Table 10, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU] (follow “Table 10” hyperlink for 
excel sheet).  An additional four million registered voters reported to have “transportation
problems” that prevented them from voting. This number was calculated by multiplying
the total number of reported registered voters in November 2016 by the percentage of
registered voters who cited to “transportation problems” as a reason for not voting.  See
Table 1, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra; Table 10, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra. 
19. Evan Andrews, Election 101: Why Do We Vote on a Tuesday in November?, 
HISTORY (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.history.com/news/ask-history/why-do-we-vote-on­
a-tuesday-in-november [https://perma.cc/ZK6D-8KPV].
20. See Matthew Rozsa, The Real Reason Many Americans Don’t Vote, DAILY DOT
(Dec. 11, 2015, 7:21 AM), http://www.dailydot.com/via/election-day-holiday-too-poor­
to-vote [https://perma.cc/EVM6-NTHB] (explaining that “in a culture where Americans 
get little time off, whether it’s to vote or do anything else,” voting is too expensive).
Advocates of implementing weekend voting argue that “[o]ur current system penalizes 
single parents, people working two jobs, and those who have to choose between getting a 
paycheck and casting a ballot.”  E.g., Steve Israel & Norma J. Ornstein, Opinion, Everybody’s
Voting for the Weekend, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/ 
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over twenty-two million registered voters did not vote in the November 
2016 election because they were “too busy” or had a “conflicting schedule.”21 
In a society that values time as money, the economic cost of leaving work
to vote is too high.
In addition to the cost and inconvenience of voting, voter discrimination is
still prevalent in several states across the nation.22  For example, a bill in 
opinion/24ornstein.html. Weekend voting, some argue, is just the fix our political system 
needs to spur increased civic engagement.  E.g., Emma-Kate Symons, The Simple Fix That 
Could Make the US A Lot Better at Democracy (and More Like the French), QUARTZ 
(June 18, 2017), https://qz.com/994868/the-simple-fix-that-could-make-the-us-a-lot-better-at­
democracy-and-more-like-the-french [https://perma.cc/2FD5-XY78] (noting that in France, 
which votes on the weekend, 75% of eligible voters cast ballots in the deciding round of
the 2017 French presidential election). 
21. This number was calculated by multiplying the total number of reported registered
voters in November 2016 by the percentage of registered voters who cited to “too busy,
conflicting schedule” as a reason for not voting. See Table 1, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra
note 18; Table 10, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 18.
 22. See Protecting Minority Voters: Our Work Is Not Done, NAT’L COMM’N ON
VOTING RIGHTS, http://votingrightstoday.org/ncvr/resources/discriminationreport [https://perma. 
cc/6MG8-HXBM].  Some scholars argue that the holding in Shelby County v. Holder 
amplifies the risk of voter discrimination. See, e.g., Marcus Hauer, Shelby County v. Holder: 
Why Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Is Constitutional and Remains Necessary to Protect 
Minority Voting Rights Under the Fifteenth Amendment, 38 VT. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2014);
Ronson P. Honeychurch, Exclusive Democracy: Contemporary Voter Discrimination and
the Constitutionality of Prophylactic Congressional Legislation, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 535, 
538 (2015) (arguing that despite progress, “discrete groups continue to have disproportionately
lower rates of voter registration and voter turnout”).  In Shelby County v. Holder, the 
Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of §§ 5 and 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of
1965.  133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).  Section 5 required states with a history of voter discrimination
to receive federal approval before making changes to their voting practices, commonly
referred to as “preclearance requirements.” Id. at 2615.  Section 4(b) set forth the formula 
for deciding which states would be subject to preclearance requirements, commonly referred to
as the “coverage formula.” Id.  This formula was created in 1965 and was “initially set to
expire after five years.”  Id.  In analyzing § 4(b), the Court noted that “[c]overage today is
based on decades-old data and eradicated practices.”  Id. at 2627 (“The formula captures 
States by reference to literacy tests and low voter registration and turnout in the 1960s and
early 1970s.  But such tests have been banned nationwide for over 40 years.”).  Accordingly,
the Court struck down § 4(b)’s coverage formula, effectively rendering § 5’s preclearance 
requirements meaningless, as there are no longer any states subject to these requirements. 
Id. at 2631 (“Congress could have updated the coverage formula at that time, but did not 
do so.  Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare Section 4(b) unconstitutional. 
The formula in that section can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to 
preclearance.”).  In a country with “vestiges of discrimination against the exercise of the
franchise by minority citizens,” however, there is arguably a continuing need for preclearance
coverage. Id. at 2634 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); see also Elizabeth Resendez, In the Aftermath 
of Shelby County: An Analysis on Why Texas Should Be Required To Pre-Clear All Voting
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Texas that required voters to present photo identification prevented over
600,000 people from participating in the electoral process.23  In striking 
this bill down, Judge Haynes of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
explained that although Texas legislators passed the voting restrictions to 
prevent fraud, “the cloak of ballot integrity could be hiding a more invidious 
purpose,” namely, discrimination.24  As of February 2018, however, thirty-four
states had voter identification laws, with eighteen of those states requiring a
photo identification card.25 
Because of these obstacles, minority and low-income voters tend to vote at
a much lower rate,26 threatening to silence the very voices a representative 
democracy aims to protect.27 
Changes, 17 SCHOLAR 1, 11 (2015) (discussing “second-generation barriers” to voting for 
minority voters, such as gerrymandering). 
23. S.B. 14, 2011 Leg., 82d Sess. (Tex. 2011).  Senate Bill 14 required voters to show 
some form of ID, such as a driver’s license, military identification card, citizenship certificate,
weapons permit, or passport. These forms of identification are hard to retrieve without 
proper paperwork.  As a result, Senate Bill 14 effectively prevented over 600,000 people 
who could not secure the specified form of identification from participating.  Jim Malewitz,
Texas Voter ID Law Violates Voting Rights Act, Court Rules, TEX. TRIB. (July 20, 2016, 
1:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/07/20/appeals-court-rules-texas-voter-id/ [https:// 
perma.cc/HL6Z-A5ZK].
24. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 241 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 
(2017).
25. Voter Identification Laws by State, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Voter
_identification_laws_by_state [https://perma.cc/77GV-EACP].  These laws have an overwhelming 
impact on minority voters. See Zoltan Hajnal et al., Voter Identification Laws and the 
Suppression of Minority Votes, 79 J. POL. 363, 363, 368 (2017); Wendy Underhill, Voter 
Identification Requirements / Voter ID Laws, NCSL (June 5, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx [https://perma.cc/JQU9-JVVT].
26. For example, in the 2016 election, the share of African American voters
decreased from 12.9% in 2012 to 11.9%, despite a slight increase in the number of eligible 
African American voters.  William H. Frey, Census Shows Pervasive Decline in 2016 Minority 
Voter Turnout, BROOKINGS (May 18, 2017) (citing Thom File, Voting in America: A Look
at the 2016 Presidential Election, U.S.CENSUS BUREAU (May 10, 2017), https://www.census.gov/ 
newsroom/blogs/random-samplings/2017/05/voting_in_america.html [https://perma.cc/
98J6-2X3K]), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/05/18/census-shows-pervasive-
decline-in-2016-minority-voter-turnout [https://perma.cc/MD2K-ARU2]; see also PEW
RESEARCH CTR., THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL INSECURITY: A DEMOCRATIC TILT, UNDERCUT BY
LOW PARTICIPATION 1–2 (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/01/1-8­
15-Financial-security-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2H5-KJXU] (finding that 94% of the
“most financially secure Americans” were registered to vote, while just 54% of the “least
financially secure Americans” were registered).
27. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 26, at 12; Hajnal, supra note 25, at 364. 
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2. The Inadequacies of Mail-In Voting
The issues facing voters in America are not limited to those who choose to
cast their ballots in person.  Mail-in and absentee voting present their own 
sets of challenges to the administration of fair elections.28 
In Veasey v. Abbott, the court identified arguably the biggest flaw 
inherent in mail-in voting: the substantial time lapse between the time
one votes and the day of the election.29  Judge Haynes explained that with
mail-in voting, “voters lose the ability to account for last-minute developments, 
like candidates dropping out of a primary race, or targeted mailers and 
other information disseminated right before the election.”30  This can lock 
absentee voters into voting for someone or something they no longer support.
Furthermore, some states do not have the infrastructure to account for 
absentee ballots that are returned on Election Day, delaying finality of
election results. In the 2016 California primary, for example, election
officials counted ballots weeks after the Democratic presidential primary.31 
Many of those who registered right before the primary election did not
even receive their mail-in ballots until after the primary was over.32  In a
hotly contested primary election, this left an overwhelming number of 
Americans feeling robbed of a fair election.33  Coupled with concerns over
the amount of time it takes to register for and return a mail-in ballot, this lack
of assurance could result in more people opting out of the process altogether.
28. In Florida, for example, ballots returned without a signature or with a signature 
that does not match the county’s file are rejected.  In 2012, this resulted in 2% of all ballots 
cast by mail being rejected by county election officials, a margin big enough to decide the
outcome of the election.  Adam Liptak, Error and Fraud at Issue as Absentee Voting Rises, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/us/politics/as-more-vote­
by-mail-faulty-ballots-could-impact-elections.html. 
29. The issue of mail-in voting and the burdens imposed on absentee or mail-in voters 
are discussed in more detail in the lower court’s decision. See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 
3d 627, 688–90 (S.D. Tex. 2014). 
30. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 256 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Veasey, 71 F. Supp.
3d at 689).
31. Ian Lovett, California Today: Yes, They’re Still Counting the Presidential 
Primary Votes, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/us/california­
today-presidential-primary-vote-count.html (“Three weeks after the state’s Democratic 
presidential primary, half a million votes remain[ed] uncounted.”). 
32. Id. (explaining that issues receiving the correct mail-in ballot on time also extended


















     
  
 
    
  





   
 
 








      
 
  
   
3. Room for Error: The Vulnerabilities of Current Vote 
Counting Measures 
In Reynolds v. Sims, Chief Justice Warren emphatically stated that “the
right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of 
our political system.”34  The process of vote counting in U.S. elections, 
however, is anything but unimpaired.35 
One such impediment is the role of provisional ballots in our election 
system.  Federal law mandates that all voters are entitled to cast a 
provisional ballot when there is uncertainty as to a voter’s eligibility.36 
These ballots are most frequently given to voters whose names do not
appear on their respective polling places’ registration lists.37  Many poll
workers, however, are not trained to administer provisional ballots, leaving
voters uninformed of their right to participate.38  Those who do fill out a
provisional ballot are left to wonder whether their vote will actually be 
verified.39  Unbeknownst to thousands of Americans, their ballots will
34.  377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). 
35. In recent history, this was most notably realized in the 2000 election between 
George W. Bush and Al Gore. After Florida was deemed ‘too close to call,’ the state underwent
a recount, drawing national attention to the issues plaguing punch-card voting systems.  In
response to growing concerns, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 
2002, which replaced the old system with electronic voting machines.  Although this quashed
public concern momentarily, it created a new set of concerns and vulnerabilities in our election 
system.  Law & Crime Staff, Here’s What Happens If Florida Is Too Close To Call, LAW
& CRIME (Nov. 8, 2016, 8:45 PM), https://lawandcrime.com/uncategorized/heres-what­
happens-if-florida-is-too-close-to-call/ [https://perma.cc/E74T-ZVWL]; see also Brian
Barrett, America’s Electronic Voting Machines Are Scarily Easy Targets, WIRED (Aug.
2, 2016, 9:57 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/08/americas-voting-machines-arent­
ready-election [https://perma.cc/KQC9-Y9T4] (analyzing in-depth the current state of electronic 
voting machines).  For a discussion of registration issues plaguing the election process,
see Top 5 Reasons Why the World Needs Our Voting Platform, FOLLOW MY VOTE, https://
followmyvote.com/top-5-reasons-why-the-world-needs-our-voting-platform [https://perma.cc/
CV3S-CJWD] (noting that there are more than 6.9 million overlapping voter registrations 
nationwide). 
36. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 302, 116 Stat. 1666, 1706
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 21082 (2014)); see also Provisional Ballots, NCSL
(June 19, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/provisional-ballots
[https://perma.cc/RR4K-MNM7] (noting that the requirement is codified in the federal 
Help America Vote Act of 2002). 
37. See Provisional Balloting, ELECTION PROTECTION, http://www.866ourvote.org/ 
issues/provisional-balloting [https://perma.cc/3HRZ-AN72].
38. Id. (“It is important to know that many poll workers are improperly trained to 
handle provisional ballots, and may fail to inform voters’ of their right to cast a provisional 
ballot.”).
39. This recently occurred in California’s 2016 primary election, where voters flocked 
to the polls only to be greeted by antiquated machines and incomplete voter rolls.  Matt 
Pearce, ‘It Was Just Chaos’: Broken Machines, Incomplete Voter Rolls Leave Some Wondering
Whether Their Ballots Will Count, L.A. TIMES (June 7, 2016, 7:49 PM), http://www.
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never be counted due to administrative errors on the part of poll workers 
and election officials.40 
Furthermore, antiquated electronic voting systems currently in use are 
vulnerable to attacks.41  In Virginia, for example, state officials were forced 
to decertify 3,000 WINvote machines after discovering that “anyone within
a half mile could have modified every vote, undetected”no technical 
experience needed.42 
Lastly, one of the biggest concerns with vote counting methods is the 
lack of transparency.  Currently, a voter has no way to verify that those 
administering the election actually record his or her vote.43  Furthermore, 
there is no mechanism in place for verifying that the total number of votes is
accurate.44 The necessity of transparency in a healthy democracy has long 
been acknowledged, yet our current system leaves oversight in the hands
of election officials, rather than in the hands of the voters themselves. 
latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-voting-problems-20160607-snap-htmlstory.html [https:// 
perma.cc/MCZ9-BK25] (“Instead of a quick in-and-out vote, many California voters were 
handed the dreaded pink provisional ballot—which takes longer to fill out, longer for 
election officials to verify and which tends to leave voters wondering whether their votes 
will be counted.”). 
40.  See, e.g., Benjamin F.C. Wallace, Charting Procedural Due Process and the 
Fundamental Right To Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 647, 648 (2016) (narrating the story of an 
Ohio voter whose vote was discarded after she was forced to fill out a provisional ballot 
in the wrong polling location). 
 41. Nsikan Akpan, Here’s How Hackers Might Mess with Electronic Voting on Election
Day, PBS (Nov. 8, 2016, 8:13 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/heres-how­
hackers-could-mess-with-electronic-voting/ [https://perma.cc/VG69-9D3K].
42. Jeremy Epstein, Decertifying the Worst Voting Machine in the US, FREEDOM TO
TINKER (Apr. 15, 2015) https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2015/04/15/decertifying-the-worst­
voting-machine-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/MF49-8APK]; see Kim Zetter, Virginia Finally 
Drops America’s ‘Worst Voting Machines,’ WIRED (Aug. 17, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.
wired.com/2015/08/virginia-finally-drops-americas-worst-voting-machines/ [https://perma.cc/
H4HU-DE33].  Virginia has since transitioned to using only paper ballots to safeguard the 
state’s elections against insecure machines and threats of hacking. Patricia Sullivan, Paper




43. See Blockchain Voting: The End to End Process, FOLLOW MY VOTE, https://
followmyvote.com/blockchain-voting-the-end-to-end-process [https://perma.cc/WK5D-DE5P]
[hereinafter Blockchain Voting]. This issue is especially troublesome for voters who cast 
a provisional ballot.  See Provisional Balloting, supra note 37. 
44. See Blockchain Voting, supra note 43. 
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B. The Current State of Online Voting 
To resolve these issues, many advocates suggest modernization through 
online voting.45  Their proposals are met with criticism, however, with 
concerns about fraud and hacking overshadowing the potential for innovation.46 
This criticism is not without merit.  In 2004, computer scientists found the 
Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment—or “SERVE”— 
vulnerable to a variety of potentially catastrophic cyber-attacks.47 More
recently, a military voting pilot implemented in 2010 by District of Columbia
election officials failed after being hacked within forty-eight hours of going 
live.48  Another thirty-six hours passed before election officials even detected 
the infiltration.49 
Threats of hacking are more prevalent now than ever, with recent evidence 
confirming that hackers probed voting systems in twenty-one states during
the 2016 election.50  Moreover, seventeen different intelligence agencies
publicly reported in 2016 that “Russia was engaged in malicious cyber
 45. E.g., Logan T. Mohs, Comment, The Constitutionality and Legality of Internet
Voting Post-Shelby County, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 181, 194 (2015). 
46.  For a list of organizations that are critical of online voting, see Internet Voting, 
VERIFIED VOTING, https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/#fn-45112-3 
[https://perma.cc/WU6D-FXTU].
47. DAVID JEFFERSON ET AL., A SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SECURE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION AND VOTING EXPERIMENT (SERVE) 2 (Jan. 21, 2004), https://pdfs.semantic 
scholar.org/686f/cad1a7d837ec3ce4ea2e54063a756075d270.pdf?_ga=2.115516038.1809
557259.1518415809-1168257884.1518415809 [https://perma.cc/TR83-GBCR].  Designed for
military and overseas voters, the system was found to be subject to “fundamental security
problems that leave it vulnerable to a variety of well-known cyber attacks . . . any one of
which could be catastrophic.” Id.
48. Scott Wolchok et al., Attacking the Washington, D.C. Internet Voting System, in 
FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY 114, 114 (Angelos D. Keromytis ed., 2012).
49. Id. at 123.  The engineer of the hack stated that “[a] real attack might be completely
invisible and could’ve gone on undetected for much, much longer.” Sarah Wheaton, Voting 
Test Falls Victim to Hackers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/
09/us/politics/09vote.html. 
50. Eric Geller & Darren Samuelsohn, More Than 20 States Have Faced Major Election
Hacking Attempts, DHS Says, POLITICO (Oct. 3, 2016, 2:08 PM), http://www.politico.com/ 
story/2016/09/states-major-election-hacking-228978 [https://perma.cc/6X65-NRSH].  Although
DHS made this information public in late 2016, September 2017 marked the first time that 
government officials contacted individual state election officials to let them know their 
systems had been targeted, confirming that the allegations were true.  Sari Horwitz et al.,
DHS Tells States About Russian Hacking During 2016 Election, WASH. POST (Sept. 22,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/dhs-tells-states-about­
russian-hacking-during-2016-election/2017/09/22/fd263a2c-9fe2-11e7-8ea1-ed975285475e_
story.html [https://perma.cc/8YGQ-CK7U].  However, “in only a handful of states, including
Illinois, did hackers actually penetrate computer systems, according to U.S. officials, and
there is no evidence that hackers tampered with any voting machines.” Id.
796
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activity in an attempt to destabilize our political system.”51 This claim may
have serious implications for the immediate future of Internet voting,
regardless of whether the claims are true.52 
Neither SERVE nor the Military Voting pilots, however, used decentralized
ledger technology, or blockchain.53  Rather, they relied on voters using a
standard browser to connect to a central server, with no guarantee of
auditability.54 
III. A CRASH COURSE ON BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
This Comment advocates for experimentation with blockchain voting
to remove the barriers preventing full participation in the election process. 
First, however, it is critical to distinguish blockchain from the technology
used in the failed online voting efforts discussed above, and build a
foundational understanding of how this technology works, its origins, and 
the present and future applications of blockchain technology. 
51. Press Release, The White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest,
12/12/16 (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/12/press­
briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-121216 [https://perma.cc/XM3D-9J6C]. 
52. The 115th Congress has responded to this threat with proposed legislation,
ranging from legislation that aims to establish investigatory commissions, to legislation
that promotes proactive education for local election officials, to legislation that develops 
a program to update computer security at political campaign committees. See, e.g., S. 27, 
115th Cong. (2017–2018); S. 1510, 115th Cong. (2017–2018); H.R. 356, 115th Cong. 
(2017–2018); H.R. 1907, 115th Cong. (2017–2018); H.R. 3623, 115th Cong. (2017–
2018); H.R. 3751, 115th Cong. (2017–2018).  For example, on September 14, 2017, U.S. 
Senators Kirsten Gillibrand (D-New York) and Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina)
introduced Senate Bill 1821 (S.B. 1821), which would establish the National Commission
on the Cybersecurity of United States Election Systems.  S. 1821, 115th Cong. (2017–2018). 
The Commission would be “based on a model similar to the 9/11 Commission that investigated
the terror attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania [and] would look into the 
cyber-attacks that took place during the 2016 election cycle and make recommendations 
on the best way to protect our nation going forward,” said Sen. Gillibrand in a press release.
Press Release, Kirsten Gillibrand, U.S. Senator, N.Y., Gillibrand, Graham Propose Legislation




53. See JEFFERSON ET AL., supra note 47, at 4.
 54. See id.
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A. The Past: The Origins of Blockchain Technology
Blockchain technology was designed by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 to 
allow parties to make direct transfers of value online.55 The Satoshi white
paper, just nine pages in length, lays out the foundation for this peer­
to-peer electronic payment system, called Bitcoin.56  In this paper, Nakamoto
outlined how to practically implement Bitcoin, detailing the roleof hashing,
proof-of-work, mining, incentives, and providing a mechanism for verification
of transfers.57 
For this system to be successful, Nakamoto recognized the need for a 
process that allowed parties to verify that money involved in a transaction had 
not already been spent.58  Therefore, blockchain provides a distributed ledger
that can be used to verify transactions.59 
One of blockchain’s defining characteristics is that it does not require a
trusted third party, like a bank, to administer or verify transactions.60 
Rather, it is decentralized and anyone can independently verify transactions
according to a predetermined set of rules.61  These rules cannot be changed 
by any one person, and rather are determined by a mathematical function 
called a “hash function.”62  Blockchain is secure against attempts to tamper 
with individual transactions because the cryptographic signature of the latest
block, or transaction, is built using the previous transaction’s signature.63 
Thus, if someone tries to modify a transaction after it has been added to 
the ledger, anyone with a copy of the blockchain can compare the signatures 
55. See Frequently Asked Questions: Who Created Bitcoin?, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.
org/en/faq [https://perma.cc/Q3FZ-RE3X]. 
56. See generally SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH
SYSTEM (2009), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/PK2E-4QHJ].  This white 
paper, published in a cryptography mailing list in 2009, was the first implementation of a 
virtual currency. Frequently Asked Questions: Who Created Bitcoin?, supra note 55. 
57. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 56, at 1–5. 
58. Id. at 2 (“The problem of course is the payee can’t verify that one of the owners
did not double-spend the coin. . . .  We need a way for the payee to know that the previous 
owners did not sign any earlier transactions.”)
59. See Hudson, supra note 3.
 60. Id.; see William Mougayar, Why the Blockchain Is the New Website, FORBES
(Dec. 21, 2015, 1:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/valleyvoices/2015/12/21/why-the­
blockchain-is-the-new-website [https://perma.cc/G8HG-HNTV] (“The fundamental innovation
with the blockchain is that the ownership of the asset is with the owner of the asset, not
with a (central) party who owns a database that points to a record that says who is the 
owner.”). 
61. See Mougayar, supra note 60. 
62. For a more technical discussion of how hashing works, see Joseph Chow, Blockchain 
Underpinnings: Hashing (Jan. 13, 2016), https://medium.com/@ConsenSys/blockchain­
underpinnings-hashing-7f4746cbd66b#.xt9aczme6 [https://perma.cc/C28A-LW92]. 
63. Norton, supra note 3.
798
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and see that it is fake.64  By creating a system based on mathematical 
proofs rather than trust, Nakamoto eliminated the need for a centralized
institution to verify transfers, thereby increasing financial integrity while
reducing transaction costs.65  The result is a system impervious to fraud. 
B. The Present: Why Blockchain? 
The startup community has since embraced Blockchain, with companies
expanding its use far beyond the realm of digital money.66  Trending among
startup companies and business owners, investments in blockchain technologies
continue to rise, reaching almost $300 million in the first six months of 
2016.67  Blockchain is now embraced by even the very institutions it was
created to circumvent: central banks.68 
Blockchain is attractive to businesses because of its ability to create a 
ledger that is immutable, distributed, and cryptographically secure.69  “With 
64. See id.
 65. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 56, at 1.
66. BlockSign, for example, employs blockchain technology to create legally binding
contracts. Danny Bradbury, BlockSign Utilises Block Chain To Verify Signed Contracts, 
COINDESK (Aug. 27, 2014, 10:54 AM), http://www.coindesk.com/blocksign-utilises-block­
chain-verify-signed-contracts [https://perma.cc/KYM8-EX67].  Ubitquity uses public ledger 
technology to record and verify transfers of real property, recording its first ownership transfer
in July 2016. Ian Allison, Blockchain-Powered Real Estate Platform Ubiquity Records 
First Property Ownership Transfer on the Bitcoin Public Ledger, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July
11, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/blockchain-powered-real-estate-platform-ubitquity­
does-first-property-ownership-transfer-bitcoin-1569980 [https://perma.cc/3LL9-3VHQ].
Everledger, a London-based startup, is using blockchain to create a public ledger to track
a diamond’s transaction history in hopes of preventing fraud and promoting ethical sourcing.
Gian Volpicelli, How the Blockchain Is Helping Stop the Spread of Conflict Diamonds, 
WIRED (Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/blockchain-conflict-diamonds-everledger
[https://perma.cc/WF3R-FEDW]; What We Do, EVERLEDGER, http://www.everledger.io/ 
[https://perma.cc/LDE7-973T].
67. VC Blockchain Investments Approach $300 Million in H1 2016 as Banks Lead 
Deployments, JUNIPER RES. (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.juniperresearch.com/press/press­
releases/vc-blockchain-investments-approach-$300-millio-(2) [https://perma.cc/525R-ESLN].
68. See Adam Ludwin, Why Central Banks Will Issue Digital Currency, CHAIN (June 6,
2016), https://blog.chain.com/why-central-banks-will-issue-digital-currency-5fd9c1d3d8a2 
[https://perma.cc/N6ZA-JV3B].  It is even predicted that by 2025, 10% of global gross 
product will be stored on blockchain technology.  GLOB. AGENDA COUNCIL ON THE FUTURE 
OF SOFTWARE & SOC’Y, WORLD ECON. FORUM, DEEP SHIFT: TECHNOLOGY TIPPING POINTS
AND SOCIETAL IMPACT 24 (2015), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GAC15_Technological 
_Tipping_Points_report_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/323P-96QH]. 
69. This means that there is a record of a transaction’s history, information added
to the record is unchangeable, the record is made public to everyone involved, and all parties
 799
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the decentralization of trust,” William Mougayar, general partner at Virtual
Capital Ventures, writes, “we will be able to exchange anything we own, 
and challenge existing trusted authorities and custodians that typically
held the keys to accessing our assets, or verifying their authenticity.”70 
Essentially, blockchain empowers companies to securely exchange any of 
their assets without the need for a middleman, allowing reduced transaction 
costs in areas beyond purely financial transaction. 
C. The Future: Preparing for Crypto-Voting 
Much like the Internet transformed the ways in which we communicate,
blockchain has the power to revolutionize almost any industry.71 Consider 
how cryptography could be used to protect patient records from breaches
of security caused by experienced hackers,72 or how blockchain could be
used to facilitate peer-to-peer smart contracts that transfer financial products 
such as insurance.73  Blockchain technology might even help ease the
tension between copyright law and privacy, allowing authors who wish to 
remain anonymous to benefit from the Copyright Act without revealing 
their identities.74 Most importantly, blockchain can help revolutionize
voting in elections by allowing secure and anonymous digital voting in 
democratic elections.75 
can trust the accuracy of the record. See The Magic of the Blockchain, CHAIN (Nov. 16, 
2015), https://blog.chain.com/the-magic-of-the-blockchain-636bf28feb64 [https://perma.cc/
GK9H-T7ZA].
70. Mougayar, supra note 60. 
71. For example, blockchain has established itself as a new medium of currency. 
See Ludwin, supra note 68; see also Joichi Ito et al., The Blockchain Will Do to the
Financial System What the Internet Did to Media, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-blockchain-will-do-to-banks-and-law-firms-what-the-internet­
did-to-media [https://perma.cc/KVV3-9C67] (“[Blockchain technology] is more likely to 
do to the financial system and regulation what the internet has done to media companies
and advertising firms.”).
 72. Jacob Donnelly, Healthcare: Can the Blockchain Optimize and Secure It?, 
BITCOIN MAG. (Jan. 12, 2016, 1:53 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/healthcare­
can-the-blockchain-optimize-and-secure-it-1452624836 [https://perma.cc/V4P8-H7UW].
73. JOSHUA DAVIS, PEER TO PEER INSURANCE ON AN ETHEREUM BLOCKCHAIN 1,
http://dynamisapp.com/whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMW7-7F8P].
74. See Thomas W. Bell, Copyrights, Privacy, and the Blockchain, 42 OHIO N.U.
L.REV. 439, 461–62 (2016) (explaining that to fully enforce a copyright, an author who remains
nameless must act through a trusted intermediary, resulting in much lower profits and the 
risk that the author’s identity is leaked by the intermediary).
75. Matthew Daniel, Blockchain Technology: The Key to Secure Online Voting, 
BITCOIN MAG. (June 27, 2015, 6:24 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/block
chain-technology-key-secure-online-voting-1435443899 [https://perma.cc/2PJ6-J67E]
(“There is a common misconception that voting cannot be done online in a secure way.
However, the introduction of blockchain technology is changing the conversation . . . .”).
800
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Congress too has recognized blockchain’s potential growth and pushed 
for the adoption of a national policy to protect this technology:
Whereas blockchain technology with the appropriate protections has the potential 
to fundamentally change the manner in which trust and security are established
in online transactions through various potential applications in sectors including
financial services, payments, health care, energy, property management, and
intellectual property management . . . .76
Introduced in July 2016 by bipartisan members of the House Energy
and Commerce Committee, H.R. 835 is an effort to situate the United States 
as a global leader in the new wave of Financial Technology, or FinTech.77 
Speaking on the House Floor on September 12, 2016, U.S Representative 
Adam Kinzinger, who introduced the bill, cited its necessity “to ensure
that the United States is competitively positioned to leverage this next
wave of technology for the economy and for consumers’ benefits.”78 Due
to the overwhelmingly positive responses from bipartisan lawmakers, the 
resolution passed in September of 2016, making it the first FinTech
resolution introduced, and passed, in the U.S. House of Representatives.79 
76.  H.R. Res. 835, 114th Cong. (2016). 
77. Id.; see Press Release, Energy & Commerce Comm., “FinTech Is the Future”—
Kinzinger & Cárdenas Encourage Innovation at Intersection of Financial and Technology
Industries (July 20, 2016), https://energycommerce.house.gov/news-center/press-releases/ 
fintech-future-kinzinger-c-rdenas-encourage-innovation-intersection [https://perma.cc/
X8D3-LEXZ].
78. Rep. Adam Kinzinger, Sep 12: Rep. Kinzinger Speaks on the House Floor Re: H.
Res 835, YOUTUBE (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yXaLpx37Slg.
79. Press Release, Adam Kinzinger, Congressman, 16th District of Illinois, Reps. 
Kinzinger and Cárdenas Pass First ‘FinTech’ Bill (Sept. 12, 2016), http://kinzinger.house. 
gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=399393 [https://perma.cc/479W-J8UF]. Members 
of the Trump administration have similarly acknowledged the transformational impact
blockchain technology could have on the public policy sector.  “We are approaching this
with an open mind,” Mark Calabria, chief economist for Vice President Mike Pence, explained 
at a Blockchain Summit held in March 2017.  Aaron Stanley, The Trump Administration

















       
 
 








   
 
 





   
   
   




   
Although there has been extended analysis of the costs and benefits of 
blockchain in the FinTech industry,80 in the business community,81  and in 
the context of corporate governance,82 little has been written about the
legal implications of applying this technology to elections.  Thus, the first 
legal question is whether Congress can encourage states to integrate blockchain
voting into federal elections while comporting with the Constitution and 
current voting laws. 
IV. CURRENT VOTING LAWS IN AMERICA
The United States Constitution delegates authority over certain aspects 
of elections to state and federal governments.83  In the election of Senators
and Representatives, states are granted control over the time, place, and
manner in which elections are held.84  This includes broad authority over
the structure and procedures for administering elections.85 Congress, however,
reserves the right to make alterations to state election systems “at any time
by Law . . . except as to the Places of choosing Senators.”86  In a presidential
 80. See generally KPMG, THE PULSE OF FINTECH, Q2 2016: GLOBAL ANALYSIS OF
FINTECH VENTURE FUNDING (Aug. 17, 2016), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/
xx/pdf/2016/08/the-pulse-of-fintech-q2-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WPX4-7ZKW] (providing a
detailed look at trends and predictions in the funding of blockchain focused companies). 
81. In Delaware, then Governor Jack Markell introduced an initiative to embrace
the emerging applications of blockchain and welcome technology industries and businesses 
into the state of Delaware.  Aptly called the Delaware Blockchain Initiative, this plan
incorporates legal ambassadors and consumer groups from the industry into the decision-
making process to work with lawmakers and legal counsel to determine the best policy for
regulating blockchain technology.  Press Release, Del. Office of the Governor, Governor 
Markell Launches Delaware Blockchain Initiative (May 2, 2016), http://www.prnewswire.com/ 
news-releases/governor-markell-launches-delaware-blockchain-initiative-300260672.html
[https://perma.cc/Z9VQ-DHCV].  Since the introduction of this initiative, Delaware has 
passed legislation recognizing “distributed ledgers” or “blockchain” as a platform for trading 
stock. Samuel Haig, Delaware Passes Bill Recognizing Stock Trading via Blockchain
Technology, BITCOIN (July 3, 2017), https://news.bitcoin.com/delaware-passes-bill-recognizing- 
stock-trading-via-blockchain-technology [https://perma.cc/Y6GV-4X6Q].
82.  For a more detailed discussion about the possibility of adapting voting mechanisms 
used to make decisions in the corporate setting to Bitcoin, see Michael Abramowicz,
Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359, 386–90 (2016). Specifically, Abramowicz 
discusses the appeal and drawbacks of applying systems such as proportionate voting,
vote-buying, and a jury system to Bitcoin.  Id.
 83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; id. art. II, § 1.
84. Id. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”).
85. See Election Administration at State and Local Levels, NCSL (June 15, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-administration-at-state­
and-local-levels.aspx [https://perma.cc/6D2D-4ZXN] (“The result is that no state administers 
elections in exactly the same way as another state, and there is quite a bit of variation in 
election administration even within states.”).
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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election, the President and Vice President are elected through the Electoral
College, a process outlined in the Twelfth Amendment.87  State legislatures
retain control over how members of the Electoral College are elected, with 
some states administering primary elections and others using caucuses to 
appoint electors.88  Congress, however, reserves the right to determine the 
time and day of general elections, which must be uniform across all fifty
states.89 
Although the Constitution affords individual states wide latitude over
the administration of elections, Congress has on several occasions exercised 
its constitutional authority to regulate state election systems.  To remedy
the invidious discrimination against black voters following the abolishment
of slavery,90 Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965,91 enforcing 
the Fifteenth Amendment guarantee of the right to vote to all citizens,
regardless of race.92  To encourage increased participation in national elections, 
Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, making it
easier for Americans to register to vote.93  To address public concern resulting 
from an election deemed too close to call by officials, Congress passed the
Help America Vote Act of 2002, calling for, among other things, the replacement 
of the punch card voting systems with electronic voting machines.94 To 
ensure the right to vote extended to active service members located overseas,
Congress enacted the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting 
Act in 1986,95 which, as amended by the Military and Overseas Voter 
87. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
88. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also Annenberg Classroom, Common Interpretation:
Article II. The Executive Branch, NAT’L CONST. CTR., http://constitutioncenter.org/
interactive-constitution/articles/article-ii/article-ii-annenberg/interp/19 [https://perma.cc/
JMD9-YJ7D] (providing the common interpretation of Article II). 
89. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
90. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (“The Voting Rights
Act was designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which 
has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century.”). 
91. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2016)). 
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
93. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511 (Supp. III 2016)). 
94. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145 (Supp. III 2016)). 
95. Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301–20311 (Supp. III 2016)).
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Empowerment Act in 2009,96 requires states to send absentee ballots to 
overseas voters at least forty-five days before the election.97  Congress has
thus demonstrated its legal authority to pass a law authorizing states to
modernize their voting systems to better reflect the technology-driven nature 
of our current society.
Any new law drafted to incentivize voting must, however, comport with 
current voting laws and constitutional requirements.  This includes the Help
America Vote Act (HAVA), which, as noted above, was passed to address 
the problems with voting systems that persisted after the 2000 election.98 
Characterized as “the most important voting rights bill since the passing 
of the Voting Rights Act in 1965,”99 it remains virtually unchanged today.100 
HAVA imposed several changes to the state-based administration of 
elections, including the grant of federal funds to states for modernizing
voting equipment.101  One condition, however, was that states comply with a
set of standards required for all voting systems used in federal elections.102 
The HAVA standards require that all state voting systems: (1) Provide 
voters the opportunity to privately verify, and if necessary change their 
vote before casting a ballot;103 (2) notify voters who have selected more
than one candidate for a single office and give them the opportunity to 
rectify this error while preserving confidentiality;104 (3) produce a record 
of the votes within audit capacity;105 (4) make participation equally as
accessible—and private—to individuals with disabilities;106 (5) provide
accessibility for voters who speak minority languages;107 (6) comply with 
96. Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 575–
589, 123 Stat. 2190, 2318–35 (2009). 
97. Id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: Move Act (Oct. 27, 2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fact-sheet-move-act [https://perma.cc/9JKJ-R9TU]. 
98. ARTHUR L. BURRIS & ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20898, THE
HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT AND ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED
ISSUES FOR THE 2016 ELECTION 1 (2016).
99. Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, Litigating Bush v. Gore in the States:
Dual Voting Systems and the Fourteenth Amendment, 51 VILL.L.REV. 229, 244 (2006) (quoting
147 CONG. REC. H9290 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2001) (statement of Rep. Lewis)). 
100. In 2009, the MOVE Act amended HAVA to authorize compliance with newly
established requirements for overseas voters.  BURRIS & FISCHER, supra note 98, at 2. 
101.  52 U.S.C. § 20901(b)(1)(F) (Supp. III 2016).  No funds for state election programs 
have been appropriated since 2010. BURRIS & FISCHER, supra note 98, at 22. 
102. These voting system standards are codified in § 21081 of Title 52 of the U.S. Code.
52 U.S.C. § 21081 (Supp. II 2014). 
103. Id. § 21081(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
104. Id. § 21081(a)(1)(A)(iii)–(C). 
105. Id. § 21081(a)(2). 
106. Id. § 21081(a)(3). 
107. Id. § 21081(a)(4). 
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the error rate no greater than that in 2002;108 and (7) adopt a uniform definition
of what constitutes a vote.109 
For purposes of HAVA, “voting system” includes the total combination 
of mechanical and electronic equipment—including software, firmware, and 
documentation required to program, control, and support the equipment— 
used to define ballots, cast and count votes, report results, and audit the
process.110  Additionally, it includes the practices used to test, maintain, 
and modify the system and make information available to voters.111 
It does not, however, outline specific systems that are permitted.  Instead, 
any new voting system must comply with these seven standards and fit 
within the definition of voting system to be used in an election for federal 
office.  To determine whether state voting systems comply with these standards,
HAVA established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC),112 an 
independent, bipartisan federal agency authorized to adopt voluntary voting
system guidelines and provide testing for national certification of hardware
and software.113 
In 2005, the EAC adopted the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, a 
228-page document providing a set of requirements against which state-
voting systems can be tested and nationally certified.114  Although HAVA 
does not require all voting systems to be certified under the EAC’s process,
most states require compliance with the EAC guidelines.115  Thus, in order
to incentivize innovation, states must be confident that their new voting 
108. Id. § 21081(a)(5). 
109. Id. § 21081(a)(6). 
110. Id. § 21081(b)(1). 
111. Id. § 21081(b)(2). 
112. Id. § 20921. 
113. Id. § 20922. 
114. U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, VOLUNTARY VOTING SYSTEM GUIDELINES
(2005), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/28/VVSG.1.0_Volume_1.PDF [https://perma.cc/FN38- 
TM58] (“The purpose of [the guidelines] is . . . to determine if [state voting systems]
provide all the basic functionality, accessibility and security capabilities required to ensure
the integrity of voting systems.”).  The EAC has updated the guidelines several times since
2005. In September 2017, for example, the EAC approved a set of principles and guidelines
focusing on improving functionality, accessibility, accuracy, auditability, and security.
Press Release, U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, Committee Approves Next Generation
of Voting System Guidelines (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.eac.gov/news/2017/09/12/
committee-approves-next-generation-of-voting-system-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/S4YM-
8F5C].
115. BURRIS & FISCHER, supra note 98, at 6.
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system will become certified and their financial investment will not be in
vain.116 
In addition to the standards set forth in HAVA, certain provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) are still applicable today and must be
considered before altering state voting systems.  Relevant to this discussion 
is the prohibition of minority vote dilution codified in § 2 of the VRA.117 
As amended,118 § 2 prohibits states from employing a voting practice that
results in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race, 
color, or membership of a language minority group—regardless of 
discriminatory intent.119  To prove a violation, the claimant need only
show that the challenged voting procedure has a racially discriminatory 
effect when viewed under the “totality of [the] circumstances.”120  Thus, § 2
makes clear that a facially neutral state voting practice can still be challenged 
on vote dilution grounds if there is a discriminatory effect on minority voters.
Therefore, any new voting system must fit within the standards set forth 
in HAVA and must be designed to minimize any disparate impact on minority
voters.  With these laws in mind, Part V of this Comment envisions a blockchain
voting system.




A blockchain voting system would not only satisfy the voting standards 
mandated by HAVA and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, but it would remedy 
the shortcomings plaguing current voting systems today.
A. Complying with HAVA’s Voting System Requirements 
Blockchain voting allows voters to maintain anonymity while verifying 
their vote, satisfying HAVA’s first voting system requirement.121  To fully
116. Currently, the process of certification is complex and expensive, creating another
barrier to state innovation in voting systems.  Id.
117. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. III 2016)). 
118. Prior to 1982, minority voters needed to establish that a voting system was adopted
with a discriminatory intent to win a vote dilution claim.  City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 70 (1980), superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. 
L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134, as recognized in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
Congress revised § 2 to clarify that a violation can be proven by discriminatory effect 
alone. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 35. 
119.  52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). 
120. Id. § 10301(b); see also Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 46 (“Plaintiffs must demonstrate 
that under the totality of the circumstances, the devices result in unequal access to the
electoral process.”).
121.  52 U.S.C. § 21081(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (Supp. II 2012). 
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understand this point, it is important to distinguish between Bitcoin and 
blockchain technology.122  Bitcoin is a virtual currency that uses blockchain 
technology to verify online transfers of money.  Bitcoin cannot provide
for anonymous transactions.123 Although this could pose a problem with Internet 
voting,124 it is desirable for money transfers, which rely on attribution of
ownership. 
Blockchain is the technology that creates the public ledger used to verify
Bitcoin’s online transfers.  Blockchain can be utilized far beyond the scope 
of virtual currencies.125  Thus, Bitcoin’s lack of anonymity does not preclude 
blockchain from being used to distribute data anonymously.126  Depending
on the type of cryptography used, blockchain can enable “end-to-end verifiable 
online elections without compromising on security or voter anonymity.”127 
Not only can a blockchain voting system preserve anonymity, it can
prevent voters from selecting more than one candidate for a single office,
thereby complying with HAVA’s second voting system requirement.128 It 
is not uncommon for absentee voters to fill out their ballots incorrectly, 
either by selecting too many candidates per ticket or inadvertently leaving
122. Because of its novelty, many people improperly conflate blockchain with Bitcoin.
This is understandable, as any Google search for “blockchain” will provide results including
“Bitcoin” and vice versa.  This improper association of Bitcoin and blockchain is widely
cited among the tech community.  Ed Featherston, Blockchain: Why It’s So Much More
Than Bitcoin, DOPPLER (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.cloudtp.com/doppler/blockchain­
why-its-so-much-more-than-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/Q3F2-MH53]; see also Mike Orcutt,
Congress Takes Blockchain 101, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www. technology
review.com/s/603820/congress-takes-blockchain-101 [https://perma.cc/V9PF-LGYJ] (explaining
the inevitability of misconceptions among policymakers as to the difference between 
blockchain technology and Bitcoin). 
123. Bitcoin’s own website is transparent about this fact, plainly stating that “Bitcoin
is not anonymous.” BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/you-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/
5KRF-PXYL].
124. Anonymity is the cornerstone of our democratic election system.  Private voting
reduces the social pressure to vote a certain way, prevents potential employers for discriminating 
based on political preference or choices, lessens the effect of group-think, and disallows 
bribery in the form of vote-buying—a method only truly effective if it can be verified that 
a person voted a certain way. See A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information
Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM.
395, 407–09, 412, 414 (1996). 
125. See discussion, supra Section II(B). 
126. See Daniel, supra note 75. 
127. Elliptic Curve Cryptography & Online Voting, FOLLOW MY VOTE, https://followmy
vote.com/online-voting-technology/elliptic-curve-cryptography [https://perma.cc/B5NG­
JU64].
128.  52 U.S.C. § 21081(a)(1)(A)(iii)–(C) (Supp. II 2014). 
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a box blank.129 Confronted with erroneous ballots, election officials are
instructed to invalidate these votes.130  With blockchain voting, however,
programmers can create notifications that appear throughout the voting
process, alerting the voter to any clerical or administrative errors made.131 
Informing the voter of these errors during the process would provide voters
an opportunity to fix their mistakes before submitting their ballots.
Another class of voters who would benefit from blockchain voting is those 
with disabilities.  Well over a decade has passed since the passage of HAVA, 
and despite its mandate for increased accessibility for disabled voters, turnout 
among those with disabilities remains low.132 Blockchain, however, offers a
convenient alternative for those unable to travel to a physical polling location. 
By allowing voters to participate in elections without leaving their homes, 
blockchain voting could help disabled voters overcome some of the obstacles 
associated with voting, thereby satisfying HAVA’s fourth voting system 
requirement.133  Furthermore, developers can easily program the application 
to appear in all languages, increasing accessibility among those who speak 
a minority language, in compliance with HAVA’s fifth voting system 
requirement.134 
Finally, by providing voters the means to independently check each 
vote, blockchain voting could inject some much-needed transparency into
the electoral process.  Follow My Vote, an organization dedicated to improving 
elections with new technology, envisions such a system: “each voter would . . .
be allowed to audit each ballot in the ballot box to confirm the vote totals 
being reported by our blockchain voting system are accurate, without revealing
 129. See Katie Orr, Mail-In Ballots Are Convenient, but Also Present Challenges, 
KQED NEWS: CAL. REP. (Apr. 10, 2016), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2016/04/10/mail-in­
ballots-are-convenient-but-also-present-challenges [https://perma.cc/8PAP-Q83U].
130. In California’s mail-in voting system, for example, there is no way to check if 
someone voted too many times in the same race until the ballot is already mailed, leading
to the invalidation of these votes. See id.
 131. Dan Lohrmann, Can Blockchain Technology Secure Your Vote?, GOV’T TECH.
(Apr. 29, 2017), http://www.govtech.com/blogs/lohrmann-on-cybersecurity/can-blockchain­
technology-secure-your-vote.html [https://perma.cc/E65U-KMKX].
132. In the 2012 presidential election, voter turnout was 5.7% lower among those with
disabilities. LISA SCHUR ET AL., DISABILITY, VOTER TURNOUT, AND VOTING DIFFICULTIES
IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS 22–23 (July 18, 2013), http://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/
images/Disability%20and%20voting%20survey%20report%20for%202012%20elections
.pdf  [https://perma.cc/GV8C-V3HX].  This equates to three million less votes nationwide.
Id. at ii. NPR similarly reports that about one-third of voters with disabilities reportedly
struggled with voting in the 2012 presidential election—“whether it was getting into the 
polling place, reading the ballot, or struggling with a machine.” Pam Fessler, Voters 
with Disabilities Fight for More Accessible Polling Places, NPR (Oct. 24, 2016, 2:56 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/10/24/499177544/disabled-voters-fight-for-more-accessible­
polling-places.
133.  52 U.S.C. § 21081(a)(3) (Supp. II 2014). 
134. Id. § 21081(a)(4). 
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the identity of each voter.”135 Because each vote will be stored on a public
ledger, anyone may count the votes themselves, and “because of the blockchain
audit trail, they can verify that no votes were changed or removed, and no
illegitimate votes were added.”136  This will not only decrease the risk of error, 
complying with HAVA’s sixth voting system requirement, but it will pave
the way for publicly auditable results, complying with HAVA’s third voting 
system requirement.
B. Satisfying Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
As discussed above, in order to prove voter dilution under § 2 of the 
VRA, a claimant must show that, given the totality of the circumstances,
the challenged voting procedure resulted in a discriminatory effect.137 
Here, there is concern that a voting system relying on Internet access and
technological prowess may have a disparate impact on voters who do not 
have equal access to the Internet.138 Legislation authorizing increased 
convenience of voting for those with Internet access, therefore, could arguably
have a discriminatory effect on some voters.139 
This claim could only be successful, however, if blockchain voting became
the only voting system in America.140  Much like absentee voting was
implemented as an alternative to physical polling procedures, blockchain
voting would initially be an addition to, rather than a replacement of, 
current voting systems.  A blockchain voting system could even be set up
at physical polling locations with free Internet, allowing those without 
individual Internet access to use the same blockchain enabled system.141
 135. Blockchain Voting, supra note 43. 
136. Blockchain Technology in Online Voting, FOLLOW MY VOTE, https://followmy
vote.com/online-voting-technology/blockchain-technology [https://perma.cc/85JC-L3JB].
137. See discussion supra Part IV. 
138. Some critics have even gone so far as to suggest that a system comprised exclusively
of Internet voting would be unconstitutional, as it would place restrictions on voting based 
on wealth status, in violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.  Brett Stohs, Is I-Voting 
I-Llegal?, 2 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 13, 13 (2003); see U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
Internet voting would only violate the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, however, if the implemented 
system mandated that the only way one can vote is through individual Internet access.
Mohs, supra note 45, at 185. 
139. Stephen B. Pershing, The Voting Rights Act in the Internet Age: An Equal Access 
Theory for Interesting Times, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1207 (2001). 
140. Mohs, supra note 45, at 185. 
141. Id. at 190. 
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States, however, would still have full constitutional authority to offer in-
person and mail-in procedures in conjunction with blockchain systems. 
Even if states shifted toward blockchain-only voting systems, courts would 
be hard-pressed to find a violation in today’s technologically advanced
society.  Although blockchain voting requires Internet access on either a 
computer or smartphone, minority voters increasingly have access to the 
Internet142 and own smartphones.143  Although white voters with individual 
access to the Internet and a smartphone, by percentage, still slightly outnumber 
minority voters, current trends show that the gap is rapidly narrowing.144 
Some scholars even suggest that Internet voting could increase turnout among 
minority groups,145 eliminating potential grounds for a vote dilution claim
under § 2.




We trust the Internet to perform critical functions in almost all other
areas of our lives, so why not voting? The answer is simple: the integrity 
of our elections is just too sacred to be held hostage by underlying threats 
of fraud.146  Blockchain, however, is cryptographically secure because it is
decentralized in nature.147  Unlike current electronic voting methods, there 
is no machine to be hacked and no central computer network to compromise.148
 142. See Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.
pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband [https://perma.cc/NT6S-F2FJ].
143. See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.pewinternet. 
org/fact-sheet/mobile [https://perma.cc/D799-BWNP] (reporting that 75% of Hispanic adults 
and 72% of African American adults own a smartphone, compared to 77% ownership among 
white adults).
144. See Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, supra note 142. African American and Hispanic 
minorities are gaining Internet access more rapidly than white Americans.  In 2010, 68%
of African Americans and 71% of Hispanics in America used the Internet. Id. In 2016, 
those numbers jumped to 85% and 88% respectively, an increase of 17% for both groups,
whereas white Americans only saw an increase of 10% between that same period. Id.  
Today, 88% of both white and Hispanic Americans use the Internet. Id.
145. Decreasing the number of physical polling locations would save money, allowing
officials to redirect funds to voter outreach and education efforts among minority voters. 
See Mohs, supra note 45, at 190. 
146. Just 29% of likely voters support online voting, with most voters sharing in the 
belief that “it’s easier to corrupt than other voting methods.”  Most Reject Online Voting,
See Higher Risk of Fraud, RASMUSSEN REP. (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.rasmussen
reports.com/public_content/politics/elections/election_2016/most_reject_online_voting_see
_higher_risk_of_fraud [https://perma.cc/84GF-8DPV].  This threat has intensified since 
instances of Russia hacking U.S. elections were discussed by both the administration and 
published in the mainstream media. See discussion, supra Section II(B). 
147. Some critics still believe blockchain voting systems are susceptible to hacking. 
See discussion, infra Part V(E). 
148. See Barrett, supra note 35. 
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As a result, votes would be stored “across a network of thousands of 
computers” instead of in one central location.149 
What makes it incorruptible is that new data, or blocks are added to the 
database, or chain, only when they are validated by a set of rules 
previously agreed upon by the network.150 Moreover, each block is signed 
by a special cryptographic method called hashing that ties the new block 
to every block that came before it.151  Any attempt to modify a previous
transaction would invalidate this signature and be detectable.  It is this 
attribute that makes the blockchain “cryptographically secure.”  In the
context of voting, if a hacker tries to manipulate the election results by 
altering previously recorded votes, it can be detected by anyoneelection 
official and voters alikeand the update, along with the attempted vote
manipulation, will be rejected.152 
Blockchain can also remedy the inadequacies associated with mail-in 
voting. By giving individual voters access to a digital ballot box, this
system would put voters back in control of their vote, empowering them 
to change their mind as events unfold.153 If a voter changes his or her 
mind, this system affords voters the opportunity to “return to the system 
and switch his or her votes at any time before the election deadline closes.”154
 149. Adele Peters, Democracy Is Getting a Reboot on the Blockchain, FAST COMPANY
(Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.fastcoexist.com/3062386/democracy-is-getting-a-reboot-on­
the-blockchain [https://perma.cc/3AUV-3E8R].  There are, however, real vulnerabilities 
with a peer-to-peer system.  For a discussion of these threats, see infra Part V(E). 
150. See discussion supra Section III(B). 
151. See Blockchain Technology in Online Voting, supra note 136. 
152. See id.
 153. See What, FOLLOW MY VOTE, https://followmyvote.com [https://perma.cc/
GX9N-PFXQ].
154. Id.  Follow My Vote provides an interesting argument as to why this technology
could disrupt the two-party system.  A common argument for why voters refrain from casting
a ballot for third-party candidates is the “fear of wasting their vote.”  Id.  By opening up
the process and allowing voters to view election results as they come in, voters can see 
how their votes are affecting the dominant party candidates and “counteract this vote-
splitting effect and shake up the current two-party system.” Id. Whether this is a good or
bad result, it could potentially increase voter turnout among disenfranchised voters hoping
to have a meaningful impact on the election.  It could, however, have an unpredictable 
impact on the integrity of the election, with voters increasingly trying to game the system.
These potential strengths and weaknesses would need to be taken into consideration when 
analyzing feasibility on a national level. 
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D. Proposals and Implementations for Utilizing Blockchain to Vote 
Because of the apparent benefits of using decentralized ledger technology 
to enable democratic voting systems, companies and governments around 
the world are already experimenting with this technology.  Democracy
Earth Foundation, for example, is using an open-source platform called
Democracy OS to try to solve the corruption rampant within democratic 
institutions.155  In an attempt to bring democracy into the 21st century, the
organization is launching a pilot program in Colombia, which, if successful, 
may open the door to official use of blockchain technology in elections in 
Latin America.156 
Echoing this sentiment, Follow My Vote has laid the groundwork for a
cryptographically secure voting system poised to “disrupt the established
voting industry.”157  Their system proposes encoding a voting system
within a Decentralized Autonomous Corporation (DAC) on the Bitshares 
platform.158  Instead of being managed by election officials, this system
would instead be managed by individual users from across the state or
country—depending on the scope of the election—called delegates.159 
Delegates would then be responsible for verifying the authenticity of votes 
before being recorded in the blockchain.160 
“[B]lockchain technology is strongest when everyone is using the same 
network.”161  Thus, it is important that blockchain voting implementation
is uniform among states.  Blockchain technology, however, varies immensely 
155. DEMOCRACY EARTH, http://democracy.earth [https://perma.cc/EH98-KFAP]; Peters, 
supra note 149. 
156. Peters, supra note 149. 
157. How, FOLLOW MY VOTE, https://followmyvote.com [https://perma.cc/746R­
AW3G].  Experimentation is not limited to domestic efforts.  In Moscow, the Department
of Information Technology is exploring blockchain voting to expand direct democracy
efforts. Samburaj Das, Moscow To Use Blockchain Tech in ‘Active Citizen’ Project, 
CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (Aug. 30, 2016, 7:15 PM), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/
moscow-to-use-blockchain-in-active-citizen-project/ [https://perma.cc/ZL9Z-BQ5D].  The
“Active Citizen” project would allow voters to “weigh in” on government issues via blockchain
polls and surveys. Id.
 158. See ADAM KALEN ERNEST, THE KEY TO UNLOCKING THE BLACK BOX: WHY THE 
WORLD NEEDS A TRANSPARENT VOTING DAC 2, 7 (July 4, 2014), https://followmyvote.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2014/08/The-Key-To-Unlocking-The-Black-Box-Follow-My-Vote.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7W9S-GH57].  The organization’s white paper explains that “[t]he benefits
of using a DAC for hosting elections are inherent in a DACs design, as it embodies many
of the characteristics that a legitimate electronic voting system requires: security, accuracy, 
transparency, anonymity, forgiveness, fairness, and efficiency.” Id. at 8. 
159. Id. at 7. 
160. See id.
161.  Ito et al., supra note 71. 
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based on a wide array of features.162  Public blockchains, for example, allow
any user to participate in the consensus process.163  Private blockchains,
however, grant permission in a more limited manner, sometimes restricting
rights to modify or read the blockchain to only a few users.164 
Uniformity can come in two forms.  First, Congress could mandate that 
all state blockchain voting systems use the same permissions, features,
and method of consensus.165  Second, states could create a blockchain
consortium, allowing for collaboration through an open source ledger and
resulting in one shared blockchain system.166  This approach would allow
for members of the consortium, or participating states, to work together to
agree on the permissions, features, and method of consensus for the shared 
system.167
 162. Id. (comparing the variation in blockchain technologies to the competing technologies
that emerged at the onset of the Internet). The two most notable variations of blockchain 
are Bitcoin and Ethereum.  Bitcoin blockchain was the first public blockchain and remains
the most widely used variation.  Ethereum blockchain has a smaller community of users, but
features its own programming language, making it the foundation of streamlined smart
contracts.  Jonathan Chester, Bitcoin or Ethereum, Which Blockchain Is Right for Your Startup?,
FORBES (Aug. 12, 2016, 11:11 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ jonathanchester/
2016/08/12/bitcoin-or-ethereum-which-blockchain-is-right-for-your-startup [https://perma.cc/ 
WB87-CMHC].
163. Types of Blockchains, BLOCKCHAINHUB, https://blockchainhub.net/blockchains
-in-general [https://perma.cc/LQ76-5Q9L] (defining the consensus process as “the process 
for determining what blocks get added to the chain”).  This type of system is secured through 
proof-of-work or proof-of-stake mechanisms.  For a more detailed explanation of proof­
of-work and proof-of-stake consensus mechanisms, see Joseph Young, Proof-of-Work vs 
Proof-of-Stake: Merits and Disadvantages, COINFOX (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.coinfox. 
info/news/6417-proof-of-work-vs-proof-of-stake-merits-and-disadvantages [https://perma.cc/
33Y9-84X6]. 
164. See Types of Blockchains, supra note 163. 
165. See discussion infra Part VII(A) (proposing that all state blockchain systems be 
nationally certified).
166. See Types of Blockchains, supra note 163 (defining “consortium blockchains” 
as systems where the consensus process is controlled by a pre-selected set of members).
In the corporate context, this could lead to new opportunities for collaboration and the sharing
of information across industry groups.  See GILBERT + TOBIN, BLOCKCHAIN AND SHARED
LEDGERS:THE NEW AGE OF THE CONSORTIUM 4 (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.gtlaw.com.au/file/ 
12306/download?token=o0jm7TyM [https://perma.cc/3XSX-2FE4].  If the members in 
control of the consensus process are pre-selected and known parties, however, the system
will look more like a private shared ledger, which is not fully decentralized. Id. at 14, 16. 
167. See  GILBERT + TOBIN, supra note 166, at 5 (explaining that participants in a 
blockchain consortium will need to construct a framework for decision making). 
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Fundamental to any healthy functioning democracy is trust.  Voters 
must trust that their vote is being counted and believe that the process is
uninhibited by external influences.  The potential for hacking and the 
complexity of a blockchain voting system might impede a voter’s ability
to trust in the new system, preventing widespread adoption. 
Although blockchain voting is significantly more secure than other forms
of Internet voting,168 some critics argue that blockchain voting is not insulated
from interception.  Dr. Jeremy Clark, cryptographic voting system 
expert, warns that “[i]f voters generate or are provided cryptographic keys to
use in the voting process, hackers will concentrate on compromising these 
keys through interception or malware.”169 
Attacks can come in a variety of forms.  A Sybil attack, for instance,
occurs when a hacker presents many different identities and manipulates 
the blockchain to the hacker’s benefit.170 A 51% attack occurs when one
user owns more than 50% of the network power, allowing the hacker to 
prevent transaction confirmations (or votes) from being added to the 
blockchain.171 These types of attacks, however, can be combatted with 
proof-of-work and proof-of-stake systems, which, when combined with
cryptographic signatures and peer-to-peer networks, make attacks less likely.172 
Another hurdle to the adoption of blockchain voting is lack of education. 
Voters lack the technical knowledge to distinguish between blockchain 
and regular models of Internet voting.  If viewed in a similar light to 
Internet voting, blockchain voting could be thwarted due to lack of public 
trust in online voting mechanisms.173  Thus, those unable to understand its
advantages might resist adoption of blockchain voting.
Furthermore, there are still many areas of election law that pose a threat
to the continuance of a participatory democracy.  Some critics may argue
that the overwhelming role that money plays in elections is to blame for 
168. See discussion supra Section V(C).
169. Jackie Burns Koven, Block the Vote: Could Blockchain Technology Cybersecure
Elections?, FORBES (Aug. 30, 2016, 5:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/ 
2016/08/30/block-the-vote-could-blockchain-technology-cybersecure-elections [https://perma. 
cc/R32T-X2KW].  Dr. Clark still envisions future elections using blockchain voting, however,
just in a more limited capacity. Id. (“An end-to-end verifiable voting system that uses a
blockchain as a public ledger but requires voters to show up and vote in person is an excellent
option for elections today . . . but reaching beyond that is too risky.”).
POLITICO (Nov. 1, 2016, 5:06 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/elections­
170. 
171. 
Abramowicz, supra note 82, at 379 & n.113. 
Id. at 379. 
172. Id. at 380. 
173. See Darren Samuelsohn, Military, Overseas Votes Raise Risk of Hacked Election, 
hacked-military-overseas-vote-230567 [https://perma.cc/F964-72PS].
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voter apathy.174  Some may fault the two major parties for hijacking our
democracy and silencing minor party and non-partisan voters.175  Some 
may cite the lack of voter education as the main reason for low participation.176 
Others may argue that the reason people no longer vote is not because of
the process, but because qualified candidates are lacking.177  And scholars
may speculate that reclassification of U.S. election systems as “critical
infrastructure” will increase regulation, and thereby insulate our elections 
from external threats.178
 174. See, e.g., About, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/L4D3-NBB2]; Money in Politics, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., http://www.
brennancenter.org/issues/money-politics [https://perma.cc/46LX-8JZG] (blaming the growing 
disconnect between voters and elected officials on “a campaign finance system that
unfairly stacks the deck in favor of the few Americans able to give exceptionally large
contributions”); Money in Politics, COMMON CAUSE, http://www.commoncause.org/issues/
money-in-politics [https://perma.cc/77NH-TETY] (“American political campaigns are now 
financed through a system of legalized bribery.  We’re working to fix it.”).
175. See, e.g., INDEP. VOTER PROJECT, http://www.independentvoterproject.org [https:// 
perma.cc/SRD6-KDR2] (arguing that closed primary systems silence non-partisan voters 
at an integral stage of the electoral process); Mission, CENTRIST PROJECT, https://www.
centristproject.org/mission [https://perma.cc/48T5-GKUT] (aiming to elect five independent 
senators to drive meaningful change in the Senate); OPEN DEBATES, https://www.open 
debates.org [https://perma.cc/3HFH-Z2NS] (seeking to open the presidential debates 
to minor party candidates). 
176. See, e.g., Bethany Brookshire, 4 Reasons Why Many People Don’t Vote, SCI.
NEWS FOR STUDENTS (Nov. 7, 2016, 7:45 AM), https://www.sciencenewsforstudents.org/ 
article/4-reasons-why-many-people-dont-vote [https://perma.cc/QV6F-446K] (noting that 
those “without a college degree . . . are less likely to seek out political information”); INDEP.
VOTER PROJECT, supra note 175 (focusing on providing unfiltered political news to 
disenfranchised voters). 
177. See, e.g., Harry Enten, Americans’ Distaste for Both Trump and Clinton Is
Record-Breaking, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 5, 2016, 8:29 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/ 
features/americans-distaste-for-both-trump-and-clinton-is-record-breaking [https://perma.
cc/A2JN-CWJK]. 
178. See Scott J. Shackelford et al., Making Democracy Harder To Hack, 50 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 629, 631–32 (2017) (discussing the implications of the Department of
Homeland Security’s classification of elections as critical infrastructure, thereby subjecting
elections to the same level of scrutiny as other sectors, like the Food and Agriculture sector
and the Information Technology Sector).  Critical infrastructure is a designation established by
the Patriot Act that refers to “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to
the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have 
a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination of those matters.” 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2001). Elections, 
thus, are now prioritized alongside power grids, telecommunications, dams, banking institutions, 
and nuclear reactors, among other industries. Critical Infrastructure Sectors, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors [https://perma.cc/K37Q- 
D7L4].
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This Comment, however, does not seek to claim that a transition into a
blockchain enabled voting system is the only solution to rectify low voter
participation.  Nor does it advocate for the elimination of traditional voting 
methods. Rather, it identifies a growing threat to democracy and provides 
a potential solution aimed at creating a more effective and inclusive
electoral process.
Despite these potential counterarguments, advancements in society no 
longer make online voting just a fantasy crippled by technological 
limitations and overarching security threats.  It is a reality that is yearning
to be explored.  As with any new technology, however, Congress has been
slow to respond.
VI. THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
If implemented in American elections, blockchain voting would comply
with all current voting laws required for Federal elections.179  Currently, 
however, there are no federal guidelines directly addressing online voting.180 
Thus, it is imperative that Congress take positive action to incentivize 
states to experiment with blockchain technology in voting systems.  This
should come in the form of a bill amending HAVA to include Internet
voting in the definition of “voting system,” the expansion of the Election
Assistance Commission by adding members in the field of cryptography
and blockchain, and the re-authorization of annual appropriations for pilot 
programs. 
A. What Congress Should Not Do: The Failed Regulation of Bitcoin 
Absent clear federal guidelines, blockchain technology could fall victim
to the same shortcomings that have made Bitcoin regulation both inconsistent
and unpredictable.  When confronted with the rise of Bitcoin, Congress 
resisted passing a federal law for its regulation.181  Instead, federal agencies
attempted to fit this new technology into existing legal definitions drafted
exclusively for commodity and government regulated fiat currencies.182
 179. See discussion supra Sections V(A)–(B). 
180. See Internet Voting, supra note 46. 
181. The first agency to extend regulation to Bitcoin was FinCEN in 2013, four years
after its creation. What We Do, FINCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do [https://
perma.cc/2G4C-7TKA].  As of 2017, “no clear statutory or textual basis exists to support
FinCEN’s finding that Bitcoin meets any definition of ‘currency’ beyond the mentioned
FinCEN rulings.” Christopher Burks, Bitcoin: Breaking Bad or Breaking Barriers?, 18 
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 244, 259 (2017). 
182. See Nicholas J. Ajello, Note, Fitting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: Bitcoin,
Money Laundering, and the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 80 BROOK.
L. REV. 435, 436, 448–49 (2015) (“Recent developments from United States federal courts
816
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Virtual currencies, however, do not function in the same manner as 
traditional currencies.
One key difference between virtual currencies, like Bitcoin, and traditional
currencies is that Bitcoin does not require transfers of currency to go through
traditional institutions, like central banks.183  Free from an institutionalized
intermediary, Bitcoin is decentralized in nature, placing it outside the reach
of government oversight.184  Yet, despite this delineated difference, policymakers 
failed to create a uniform regulatory scheme catered to Bitcoin’s novel
architecture.  Federal agencies continue to categorize virtual currencies
alongside fiat and commodity currency for regulatory purposes, thereby 
subjecting Bitcoin to rules created for intrinsically different forms of
currency.185 
The first regulatory agency that provided authoritative guidance for the 
treatment of virtual currencies under federal law is the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury.186 Tasked with combatting money laundering, FinCEN enforces
federal laws governing money services businesses in the United States.187 
One such law is the Bank Secrecy Act,188 which aims to prevent money 
laundering and requires federal agencies to warn of suspicious activity by
and regulatory bodies indicate that the existing money laundering regulatory framework 
will guide Bitcoin regulation.”); see also Marco Santori, Bitcoin Law: What US Businesses 
Need To Know, COINDESK (Aug. 17, 2013, 8:52 AM), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin­
law-what-us-businesses-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/6EXJ-3TCB] (highlighting the 
different levels of confusion surrounding the release of FinCEN’s guidelines relating to
the regulation of bitcoin). 
183. Joshua J. Doguet, Comment, The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory 
Issues Surrounding the Bitcoin Digital Currency System, 73 LA. L. REV. 1119, 1119 (2013)
(citing NAKAMOTO, supra note 56, at 1–2, 4). 
184. Id. at 1121 (citing Cindy Cohn, EFF and Bitcoin, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (June 20, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/06/eff-and-bitcoin [https:// 
perma.cc/4FY8-28QV]). 
185. See Ajello, supra note 182, at 448 (“Recent developments from United States
federal courts and regulatory bodies indicate that the existing money laundering regulatory
framework will guide Bitcoin regulation.”). 
186. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S 
REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES
1 (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2CCJ-HAQK] [hereinafter FINCEN GUIDANCE]; Santori, supra note 182 
(“The first regime [for regulating bitcoin], and the regime that has received the most press 
over the past few months, is the law of money transmission.”). 
187. What We Do, supra note 181. 
188.  31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012). 
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creating registration, reporting, and record-keeping regulations for financial 
institutions.189 In 2013, FinCEN published a policy providing guidance
on the applicability of the Bank Secrecy Act to users and businesses engaging 
in the exchange of virtual currencies.190 In order to be subject to the reporting 
requirements set forth in the Bank Secrecy Act, a person or business 
partaking in the transfer of virtual currencies must fall within the bureau’s
definition of a “money transmitter.”191  Thus, whether Bitcoin activity is
subject to federal regulation rests upon whether a digital transfer is considered
“money transmitting” within the definition outlined by FinCEN.192 
The above-mentioned sequence illustrates the standard legal routine: 
Congress passes a law, an agency tasked with enforcement provides guidance 
on the applicability of the law while defining terms central to its implementation,
and application of the law is then reviewed on a case-by-case basis.  The
determination of whether Bitcoin use fell squarely within these defined 
categories is anything but clear.  As a result, its regulation has been both 
inconsistent and unpredictable.  For businesses trying to capitalize on the 
popularity of virtual currencies, attempting to navigate a regulatory scheme
“too complicated to deal with” may simply not be worth the risk.193 
For states struggling to enforce anti-money laundering regulations, the
uncertainty has culminated in conflicting judicial rulings.  A federal district 
court in New York, for example, held that bitcoin is “money,” thus virtual 
currency exchangers can be punishable under federal law.194  At issue in 
189. Id. 
190. FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 186. 
191.  31 C.F.R. § 1010.100 (2014); id.
192. Generally, FinCEN holds that a user of virtual currency is not a “money transmitting
business” (MSB) for the purposes of BSA enforcement, whereas administrators and exchangers
are, and are thus subject to the reporting requirements set forth in the BSA. FINCENGUIDANCE, 
supra note 186, at 1.
 193. Joe Southurst, US State Regulators: Bitcoin Businesses Aren’t Applying for
Licenses, COINDESK (Dec. 10, 2013, 5:23 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/us-state-regulators­
bitcoin-businesses-licenses [https://perma.cc/6M5F-8YM2].  One example of this is the 
story of Mike Caldwell, who started a business selling freshly minted physical bitcoins as 
a novelty item, accepting only bitcoin in exchange for his product.  His physical bitcoins soon 
became the most identifiable image of the intangible currency. After receiving a letter
from FinCEN that defined his activity as money transmitting, however, Caldwell decided 
to shut down his business, citing confusion over the “federal regulatory hoops” as his reason
for halting production.  Robert McMillan, US. Government Nastygram Shuts Down One-
Man Bitcoin Mint, WIRED (Dec. 12, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/12/ 
casascius [https://perma.cc/T92Y-WST7]. 
194. United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that 
the federal law in place to prevent money laundering, § 1960 of the United States Code,
was designed to “keep pace with such evolving threats”); see also Housing Programs 
Under Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 102­
550, § 1512, 106 Stat. 4012, 4057 (1992) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2012))
(criminalizing people knowingly involved in an unlicensed money transmitting business). 
818
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United States v. Faiella was whether Faiella, charged with using bitcoin 
currency to operate an illegal market on the website “Silk Road,” qualified 
as a “money transmitter” and thus was subject to punishment under § 1960 
of the United States Code.195  Finding that bitcoin was unequivocally money,
District Judge Rakoff held that Faiella’s activities constituted “transmitting” 
under § 1960.196  The court further cited FinCEN’s guidance to affirm that
“virtual currency exchangers constitute ‘money transmitters’ under its 
regulations,” and are punishable under federal law.197  While the legal weight
of this decision is limited to persuasive authority, it demonstrates at least
one approach to virtual currency: treat bitcoin like money.
A Florida state court judge, however, has taken a different approach,
ruling that because of the divergent nature of Bitcoin, it should not be 
classified as money for regulatory purposes.198  “Nothing in our frame of 
references allows us to accurately define or describe Bitcoin,” Judge Teresa 
Pooler acknowledged, dismissing money laundering charges against a
defendant who sold bitcoins to an undercover detective allegedly using
them to engage in illegal activity.199  “Bitcoin has a long way to go before
it is the equivalent of money,” she added, noting that until the Florida 
Legislature drafts policy regulating this uniquely divergent currency,
“attempting to fit the sale of Bitcoin into a statutory scheme regulating 
money services businesses is like fitting a square peg in a round hole.”200 
Bitcoin’s application simply does not fit within the scope of existing 
federal definitions. While the regulatory nightmare surrounding Bitcoin
may spell out the collapse of the virtual currency,201 it has provided us with a
 195. 
196. 
Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 546. 
Id.
 197. Id.
 198. See Florida v. Espinoza, No. F14-2923, slip op. at 5–6 (Fla. Cir. Ct., July 22, 2016), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article91785802.ece/BINARY/Read%20
the%20ruling%20(.PDF)#storylink=related_inline [https://perma.cc/S9MV-RHB9] (ruling
that bitcoin is not currency because it “cannot be hidden under a mattress like cash and gold
bars,” and therefore, it cannot be regulated as a “monetary instrument” in accordance with
Florida statutory law). 
199. Id. at 5, 7–8. 
200. Id. at 6. Marco Santori, Chairman of the Bitcoin Foundation’s Regulatory Affairs
Committee, notes that bitcoin entrepreneurs have similarly felt that the current regulatory
scheme is the equivalent of “modern square pegs being jammed into round regulatory
holes meant for ancient business models.”  Santori, supra note 182. 
201. Jason Bloomberg, Something Rotten in the State of Bitcoin, FORBES (Jan. 18,
2016, 11:22 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/2016/01/18/something­
rotten-in-the-state-of-bitcoin/#45f5aaa13eed [https://perma.cc/T2PF-LZVH]; Jay Adkisson, 
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B. Lessons Learned: What Bitcoin’s Failed Regulation Can Teach Us 
Like Bitcoin, there are currently no federal standards or guidelines in 
place for Internet voting.202 Accordingly, blockchain voting might not be
interpreted uniformly by states to fit within the current definition of “voting
system.”  Voting systems are statutorily defined as the mechanical and
electronic equipment used in the election process as well as the practices
used to test the system and maintain transparency.203 While blockchain
could conceivably fit within this definition,204 it remains up for debate until 
Congress explicitly authorizes its use in state-administered elections. 
Mirroring the uncertainty that surrounded Bitcoin’s regulation, confusion 
as to what constitutes a voting system may lead to inconsistent and contradictory
judicial rulings.  A district judge in one state may not believe that a vote 
cast on the Internet is truly confidential, as it is more susceptible to fraud, 
and may rule that blockchain voting does not comply with HAVA’s anonymity
requirement.205 A district judge in a different state, however, may believe
that the only way to make voting systems fully accessible to individuals
with disabilities, in line with HAVA’s specified goal,206 is to allow for
cryptographically secure online elections.  With Bitcoin, inconsistencies
like these created a culture hostile toward experimentation.207  Likewise, 
the potential for inconsistent regulation of blockchain voting might discourage
states from investing, fearful that new voting systems might not satisfy 
HAVA’s current voting system standards.208 
Why Bitcoin Is So Volatile, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2018 11:10 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/jayadkisson/2018/02/09/why-bitcoin-is-so-volatile/#514cc90939fb [https:perma.cc/
E99B-3NW5] (comparing investment in cryptocurrency, like Bitcoin, to the stock market
bubble preceding the Great Depression). 
202. See Internet Voting, supra note 46.  After failed attempts to develop a secure online
voting system for overseas and military voters, the federal government abandoned its efforts
for online voting. Id.
 203. See discussion supra notes 110–11. 
204. See discussion supra Part V. 
205.  52 U.S.C. § 21081(a)(1)(C) (Supp. II 2014). 
206. Id. § 21081(a)(3). 
207. Timothy B. Lee, Bitcoin Was Supposed To Change the World. What Happened?,
VOX (Nov. 21, 2016, 10:10 AM), http://www.vox.com/new-money/2016/11/21/13669662/ 
bitcoin-ethereum-future-explained [https://perma.cc/JRF3-EWRF] (“The Bitcoin community
has been hampered by a dysfunctional culture that has grown increasingly hostile
toward experimentation.  That has made it difficult for the Bitcoin network to keep up with 
changing market demands.”).
208. Although Bitcoin and blockchain are two uniquely different ventures, comparing
their development is not far-fetched.  Both are complex technologies, both are decentralized in
820
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In fact, Congress’s failure to provide clear guidelines for Internet voting 
has already resulted in stunted innovation, with many states passing laws 
prohibiting Internet voting systems.209  With no guarantee that blockchain
voting systems will be authorized for federal elections, states have no assurance 
that their new systems will pass federal scrutiny and be certified.210  Risk-
averse states will thus have little to no incentive to spend money on a
system that may ultimately never come to fruition. 
Just as Bitcoin functions differently than fiat currency, blockchain voting
functions differently than traditional voting methods.  For this reason, it
is critical that blockchain regulation does not fall within the legal routine 
described above, muddied with uncertainty in enforcement.211  Instead, Congress 
must clearly authorize and incentivize states to modernize voting systems.
Congress has acted before to remedy the political ailments plaguing our 
electoral process.212  In a political climate fueled by hyper-partisanship213 
and defined by increasing levels of voter dissatisfaction,214 it is time for Congress 
to act again. 
nature, and both are not federally regulated.  Thus, using Bitcoin’s regulatory mishaps to 
predict the possible fate of blockchain can provide valuable insight into an otherwise novel 
industry.
209. For example, California law prohibits casting a ballot over the Internet. 
Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. SEC’Y STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/frequently­
asked-questions [https://perma.cc/YN4C-VTEY].  For a full list of the progress of online 
registration and voting in each state, see Online Voting and Voter Registration by State, 
FOLLOW MY VOTE, https://followmyvote.com/voter-resources/online-voting-voter-registration­
by-state (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
210. Although HAVA does not require state voting systems to be federally certified,
most states mandate that their voting system be tested and conform with the EAC guidelines 
for certification. Voting Equipment Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE 
COMMISSION, https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/
YM86-4ET5]; see also U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, CATEGORIES OF STATE,
TERRITORY, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PARTICIPATION IN FEDERAL VOTING STANDARDS
(Jan. 31, 2011), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/State_Participation_in_Testing_and_
Certification—Chart_Only_for_Website_01312011.pdf [https://perma.cc/28SR-64K7] (noting
that thirty-five states require testing to federal standards, testing by a federally accredited 
laboratory, or federal certification). 
211. See discussion supra Part VI(a).
212. See discussion supra Part IV. 
213. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 13. 
214. See Congressional Performance, RASMUSSEN REP. (July 5, 2017), http://www. 
rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/mood_of_america/congressional_perform
ance [https://perma.cc/3QCC-JX44] (finding that just 15% of likely U.S. voters think
Congress is doing a good or excellent job).  Political dissatisfaction following the 2016 
general election resulted in nationwide protests against the then president-elect Donald 
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VII. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE: DIGITAL DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2018
To incentivize states to modernize voting systems with blockchain 
technology, Congress should pass a bill to amend the Help America Vote 
Act of 2002 to include Internet voting in the definition of “voting system,” 
expand the Election Assistance Commission by adding members in the
field of cryptography and blockchain, and re-authorize appropriations for 
pilot programs. This Act may be cited as the “Digital Democracy Act of 
2018.”
A. Define “Voting System” 
As is, HAVA defines voting system broadly, with no explicit indication
that Internet voting falls within its definition.  To mitigate the chilling effect 
this may cause, § 21081(b)–Voting system defined should be amended by 
adding the following after the function of a voting system is explained: 
(3) this includes, but is not limited to, any combination of –
(A) optical scan paper ballot systems, 
(B) direct recording electronic (DRE) systems, 
(C) email, fax, or remote electronic transmission for military/overseas voters; and
(D) decentralized ledger, or blockchain enabled Internet voting systems.
Because of the increased security risks that accompany any new voting 
technology, Congress should additionally require that states testing blockchain 
voting systems be certified by laboratories accredited by the Commission.215 
Section 20971(a)–Certification and testing should be amended by adding:
(3) Mandatory use by states 
States employing a blockchain voting system under subtitle III must certify
its voting system source code.  Certification must be by a laboratory accredited 
by the Commission under this section before the system may be used by
a county in conducting a pilot program. 
Specifying that certification is mandatory for blockchain enabled voting 
systems, as opposed to applying the current statutory language that merely
makes certification optional, will serve two distinct purposes.  First, by 
Trump, with millions organizing online efforts and petitions asking electors to vote against
Trump in the Electoral College.  See Daniel Brezenoff, Electoral College: Make Hillary Clinton 
President., CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/electoral-college-make-hillary-clinton- 
president-on-december-19-4a78160a-023c-4ff0-9069-53cee2a095a8 [https://perma.cc/
W6M4-NSRF]; Christopher Mele & Annie Correal, ‘Not Our President’: Protests Spread 
After Donald Trump’s Election, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/11/10/us/trump-election-protests.html. 
215. Currently, § 20971 gives states the option to test and certify its voting system
hardware and software.  52 U.S.C. § 20971(a)(2) (Supp. II 2014). 
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requiring that all blockchain voting systems be certified by a nationally
accredited laboratory, Congress can ensure that all state systems use the
same permissions, features, and method of consensus, thereby bolstering
the strength of the blockchain voting system while satisfying the uniformity
mandated by HAVA.216  Second, certification can increase voter confidence
that their ballot will be protected against external security threats, increasing 
public trust in the system.217 
B. Expand the Election Assistance Commission 
One of HAVA’s main objectives is to improve elections by providing
voluntary voting guidelines for states to follow.218  To stay up to date with
current technologies, HAVA mandates these guidelines be updated every
four years,219 authorizing the EAC to provide states with guidelines for 
blockchain voting if desired.  The adoption of new guidelines, however, 
requires the review of the Standards Board and the Board of Advisors.220 
Thus, to ensure that the updated guidelines are drafted and reviewed by
qualified experts, Congress must amend § 20943 and § 20944 of HAVA 
to include more cryptography and blockchain representatives on the
Standards Board and the Board of Advisors, respectively.221
 216. Id. § 21081(a)(6); see discussion supra Section V(D). 
217. The need for increased cybersecurity in our elections has become increasingly
critical, for “[o]ne in four American voters say they will consider not voting in upcoming 
elections due to concerns over cybersecurity.”  Joe Uchill, One in Four Will Consider Not 
Voting in Elections Due to Cybersecurity, THE HILL (July 12, 2017, 9:00 AM), thehill. 
com/policy/cybersecurity/341608-one-in-four-will-consider-not-voting-in-elections-due­
to-cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/H8CZ-UGE4]. 
218. To guide in this task, HAVA authorized the creation of the Technical Guidelines 
Development Committee, comprised of the Director of National Institute of Standards and 
Technology and fourteen other experts, to provide an initial set of recommendations.  52
U.S.C. § 20961 (Supp. II 2014). 
219. Id. § 21101. 
220. 52 U.S.C. § 20962(c) (Supp. II 2014) (explaining that as part of the process of 
adoption of the voluntary voting system guidelines, “the Board of Advisors and the Standards
Board shall review and submit comments and recommendations regarding the guideline 
(or modification) to the Commission”).
221. Although the adoption of new guidelines also requires the involvement of and 
advise from the Technical Guidelines Development Committee, this Committee is sufficiently
modern.  Its members include the Director of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, a representative of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and 
other individuals with “technical and scientific expertise relating to voting systems and 
voting equipment.”  Id. § 20961(c)(1).  The Act also authorizes the Director of the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, at the request of the Committee, to provide technical 
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Currently, the Standards Board is composed of 110 members total
fifty-five state elections officials and fifty-five local election officials.222 
Tasked with reviewing the voluntary voting system guidelines,223 the 
Board’s only federal requirement for appointment is that members representing
the same state may not be members of the same political party.224  Section 
20943(a)Composition should be amended by changing the total number 
of members from 110 to 120 and appending to the end the following
paragraph: “(1)(C) Ten shall be representatives from the National Science
and Technology Council of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.”225 
The Board of Advisors, which also plays an integral role in reviewing 
and modifying the voluntary voting system guidelines,226 is similarly lacking 
in technology experts.227  There are thirty-seven members in total, with
just four vacancies allocated for science and technology professionals.228 
Section 20944(a)In General should be amended by changing the total 
number of members from thirty-seven to forty-one and adding at the end the 
following paragraph: “(a)(17): Four members representing professionals in
the field of cryptography, all of whom shall be appointed by the Congressional 
Blockchain Caucus.”229 
Congress can help ensure that the new voting system guidelines are sufficiently
compatible with blockchain voting by including experts in technology,
lawmakers who understand the importance of blockchain technology, and 
cryptographers who understand blockchain’s technical constraints and are 
trained to use cryptography to secure private information.  These newly
appointed experts could also encourage the creation of a collaborative blockchain
support to help develop the guidelines, specifically including “remote access voting, including
voting through the Internet.”  Id. § 20961(e).
222. Id. § 20943(a)(1). 
223. Id. § 20942. 
224. Id. § 20943(a)(3). 
225. National Science and Technology Policy, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.white 
house.gov/ostp/nstc [https://perma.cc/8GG3-NWM2] (noting that one of the National
Science and Technology Council’s missions is to “coordinate science and technology 
policy across the diverse entities that make up the Federal research and development
enterprise,” qualifying members of this office to take part in the process of reviewing
voting system requirements). 
226. See 52 U.S.C. § 20942. 
227.  For a full list of the composition of the Board of Advisors, see id. § 20944(a).
228. Id.
 229. The Congressional Blockchain Caucus was recently formed by Rep. Mick
Mulvaney and Rep. Jared Polis to advance public policy in blockchain-based technologies. 
Recognizing the need for Congress to be better informed on the growing technology, Rep.
Polis stated, “It’s vital for Americans, businesses, and members of Congress to learn about 
blockchain so the U.S. can continue to secure its stance as the global leader of ingenuity.”
Press Release, Jared Polis, U.S. Congressman, 2d Dist. of Colo., Polis Launches
Congressional Blockchain Caucus (Sept. 26, 2016), http://polis.house.gov/news/document 
single.aspx?DocumentID=398230 [https://perma.cc/QXT8-67R3]. 
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consortium, focused on developing the best model for blockchain-based
voting systems.230 
C. Re-authorize Appropriations for Pilot Programs 
Although including blockchain experts in the decision-making process 
will likely provide more clarity for states hoping to explore blockchain voting, 
it does not help states fund new voting systems.231  To fully incentivize
states, counties, and private vendors to innovate before upcoming elections,
the Commission must provide financial incentives to states for implementing 
blockchain pilot programs. 
Currently, U.S. Code § 21051 allows the Commission to provide grants 
to carry out pilot programs that test and implement new technologies in
voting systems.232  Eligibility is conditioned upon certification that the
pilot program will comply with HAVA’s voting system standards, and funding 
is granted upon review of the Commission.233  While a blockchain voting
pilot program could comply with HAVA’s standards,234 appropriation of
230. The idea of a blockchain consortium is not a novel concept.  In April 2016, 
Japan launched the first blockchain consortium, which has since grown to include 100 tech
companies and startups.  Michael del Castillo, Japanese Blockchain Consortium Grows to 
More Than 100 Members, COINDESK (Dec. 15, 2016, 7:35 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/
japanese-blockchain-consortium-grows-100-members [https://perma.cc/68LR-P9Q6].
The financial industry has since followed suit, with over eighty financial institutes
collaborating in a blockchain consortium led by startup R3.  Anna Irrera, Illinois Watchdog
First U.S. Regulator To Join Blockchain Consortium R3, REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2017, 12:55
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-blockchain-illinois-idUSKBN16N2FN [https://perma.cc/
YVC7-2HVV] (stating that the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation 
marks the first U.S. regulator to join R3). Similarly, IBM has partnered with Hyperledger 
and The Seam to form the first blockchain consortium in the commodities market, an effort
that could transform the cotton industry and how it does business.  Luke Parker, The Seam 
and IBM Launch the First Cotton Industry Blockchain Consortium, BRAVE NEW COIN
(Jan. 9, 2017), https://bravenewcoin.com/news/the-seam-and-ibm-launch-the-first-cotton­
industry-blockchain-consortium [https://perma.cc/C76F-PKTQ].  The consortium approach, 
Senior Vice President of IBM Research speculates, “can help create greater efficiency and 
serve as the foundation of a robust system for massive collaboration.” Id.
231. Generally, elections in the United States are administered at the county level. 
Over the last fifty years, however, the cost of elections has shifted to states, with federal
laws such as HAVA mandating increased involvement from state election officials.  See
Election Costs: What States Pay, NCSL (Jan. 11, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
elections-and-campaigns/election-costs.aspx [https://perma.cc/8G93-W8EZ].
232.  52 U.S.C. § 21051(a) (Supp. II 2014). 
233. Id. § 21051(b). 
234. See discussion supra Section V(A).
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funds was limited to the fiscal year 2003.235 Thus, Congress should amend 
§ 21053(a)—In General by striking “$10,000,000 for fiscal year 2003” 
and inserting “$15,000,000 for fiscal years 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022.”236 
To receive federal funds under HAVA, states are required to submit
a plan outlining how the funds would be used.237  Allocation of federal 
funds under the Digital Democracy Act of 2018 would similarly require a 
proposal from state entities requesting federal funding for the innovation 
of voting technology.  Upon the Commission’s approval of eligibility, the 
implementation of the state’s proposed blockchain voting system would be 
monitored and evaluated by the Director of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology and adjusted accordingly.238  These evaluations would then
be submitted to the Commission and ultimately included in the annual report
to the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate, pursuant 
to § 20972.239 
By clearly defining voting system to include Internet voting, injecting 
cryptography experts into the decision-making process, and providing federal
funding for innovative technologies in voting systems, the Digital Democracy 
Act of 2018 could pave the way for experimentation in blockchain voting
and greater political participation nationwide. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
Once a technological enigma, the Internet is now deeply engrained
in the fabric of our society, with more than 3.8 billion users worldwide.240 
Essential to present-day notions of connectivity, it is almost impossible to
imagine life without it.  We now seek out intimacy by swiping right;241 
235.  52 U.S.C. § 21053(a) (Supp. II 2014). 
236. This number is an approximation of the current and future value of ten million
dollars, due to inflation.  CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc. 
pl?cost1=10%2C000%2C000&year1=200001&year2=201802 [https://perma.cc/86A6­
AYMV].
237. See Election Costs: What States Pay, supra note 231. 
238. This requirement originates from § 21051(c)(3) of the Help America Vote Act.  
52 U.S.C. § 21051(c)(3) (Supp. II 2014) (“After the Commission has awarded a grant . . . 
the Commission may request that the Director monitor the grant, and (to the extent permitted
under the terms of the grant as awarded) the Director may recommend to the Commission
that the recipient of the grant modify and adjust the activities carried out under the grant.”). 
239. Id. § 20927(2) (“A copy of each report submitted to the Commission by a 
recipient of such grants or payments which is required under such a program . . . .”).
240. Internet Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet­
users [https://perma.cc/7ZJK-63ZK].
241. Dating applications for your personal device, like Tinder, provide users the 
option of showing interest in a potential match by swiping right on someone’s profile. 
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we broadcast our identities through social platforms; we reveal our hopes 
and aspirations in 140 characters or less;242 we pay our taxes while sitting
in a local coffee shop; we can even get our groceries delivered right to our 
doorstep.
Yet, our elections have remained relatively unchanged, with most voting
taking place at physical polling locations.  And while we trust the Internet 
in almost all other aspects of political electioneering, be it education, online
voter registration, campaign fundraising, social media campaigns, or public 
opinion polls, arguably the most important function of democracythe act 
of votinghas yet to transition. 
The importance of creativity and modernization in advancing the democratic 
process is paramount.  Thus, this Comment proposes that Congress amend
HAVA to allow and incentivize states to explore the feasibility of adopting 
blockchain voting systems in public elections.  By including blockchain
voting in the definition of voting system, states can innovate with confidence. 
By adding cryptography experts in the EAC and tasking them with reviewing
federal guidelines, Congress can ensure that guidelines aimed at informing 
states are compatible with blockchain voting systems.  And by appropriating
funds for the fiscal years leading up to the 2020 and 2022 elections, Congress
can incentivize much-needed innovation in our political process. 
Maybe our political system is not yet ready for an entirely new software 
program to disrupt traditional methods of voting.  Maybe Americans are 
not ready to accept a technology that they cannot yet conceptualize.  But
maybe blockchain is the key we’ve been searching for to unlock our 
democracy. 
Swipe right (or Left), OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
swipe_right_%28or_left%29 [https://perma.cc/Q6BZ-9AGW].
242. When created in 2006, the social network Twitter famously limited the number
of characters available in each “tweet” or message to 140. Character Counting, TWITTER
DEVELOPER, https://dev.twitter.com/basics/counting-characters [https://perma.cc/A2VV­
PNRN].  Twitter has since expanded its character count from 140 to 280 characters.  Sara
Perez, Twitter Officially Expands Its Character Count to 280 Starting Today, TECHCRUNCH
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/07/twitter-officially-expands-its-character­
count-to-280-starting-today [https://perma.cc/KV8S-Y4CB].
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